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T}ie  pl`oblern  presented   to   the  writer  ha,s  been  a.n  examina.tion
of  United  States  economic  and  military  assistance  to  China  from
the  I.:arco  Polo  Brid{;.e  incident  of  July  7,   1937,   until  the  Pearl
Elarbor  ai;tack  on  December  7,   194.I.     Io  properly  evaluate   this
assistance,   attention  must  be  given  to  assistance  furnis'hed
China  fi.on  other  nations,   the  unique  problems  of  transportation
to  that  nation  under  Japanese  blockade,   and  the  general  state
of  changing.  world  affairs  at  that  time.
This  task  has  not  proved  an  easy  one.     Almost  all  \i/orks
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concerned  \.7ith  the   origins  of  World  War  11,   twentieth-century
Asian  history,   and  American  diplomatic  history  make  refere-nee
to  President  Roosevelt's  refusal  to  find  a  war  in  China,   there-
fore  not  enacting  the  neutrality  leg.islation  so  that  China
could  obtain  American  arms  and  munitions  in  her  war  opposiii€
Japanese   ag.gression.     But   these  accounts   stop  `./ith  one   or  t.i.ro
sta,tements  and  no   specific  infol`nation  as  to  the   types  of
a.ssistance,   amounts,   or  value  to  the  Chinese  government  and
military.    Where  this  is  true  with  Sino-American  relations,
there   is  a  wealth  of  published  information  concerning.  United
States  assistance  to  Great  Britain  and  United  States  relations
with  Japan  in  this  time  period.
The  primary  rr]aterials  used  in  this  study  are  the  forei:n
relations  :'japers,   reports  of  press  conferences  cand  specchcs,
(ii)
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memoirs  and  diaries,  and  general  accounts  of  individuals
involved  in  the  various  pl.ograms.
From  this  investigation,  it  was  found  that  the  United
Statesl  program  of  assistance  to  China  went  through  three
different  stages  of  development.    The  first  stage  was  a
continuation  of  the  silver  purchasing  policy  which  gave
foreign  exchange  credits  to  China,  the  second  stage  included
a  series  of  Export-Import  Bank  loans  that  also  provided  foreign
exchange  credits,  and  the  third  stage  was  a  program  of  military
assistance  under.  the  Iiend-Iiease  provisions.     In  comparison
to  the  Soviet  Unionls  program  of  assistance  to  China,   the
United  States'  program  seems  insignificant;   in  fact,   the
Soviet's  aviation  and  military  assistance  pre-dated  i;h`e
Lend-Iiease  Act  and  the  American  Volunteer  G.roup  by  over  three
years.    United  States  economic  and  military  assistance  to
China  in  the  years  1937  to  1941  can  best  be  described  as
too  little  and  too  late.
PREFACE
This  writer  has  been  challenged  by  the  vague  treatment
of  Sino-American  relations  in  the  years  just  before  our  entry
into  World  War  11.     One  area  that  seemed  extremely  cloudy  was
the  United  States  assistance  program  to  China.     It  is  hoped
that  the  follo`.ring  study  will  present  a  true  and  unbiased
account  of  United  States  economic  and  military  assistance  to
China  in  the  years  1937  to  1941.
In  order  to  properly  understand  and  evaluate  United  States
assistance  to  China  it  is  necessary  to  investigate  the  assistance
programs  of  other  nations.     Hot.Jever,   the  following  only  presents
a  summary  of  these  programs  with  the  pl`o8.ram  of  the  United
States  alone  handled  in  deta,il.    Also,   a  number  of  other  factors
that  directly  affected  Unii;ed  States  foreign  policy  must  be
considered  to  add  understanding  to  this  study.    A  careful
look  at  the  domestic  scene  in  the  United  States  in  the  late
1930's  shows  the  continuing  great  depression  and  the  feeling
and  quest  for  neutrality  and  isolation.    Meanwhile,   there  wel.e
the  rapidly  charlc;ring  world  events  of  that  time.    Finally,
1.7hen  a  program  of  assistance  to  China  was  organized  there
were  the  enormous  geographic  barriers  that  prevented  easy
transportation  and  communica,tion  with  the  Chinese  govern-
ment  and  military.
(iv)
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Chapter  I
INTRODUCTION
China  in  1937  was  anything  but  a  stl.ongly  unified  country,
demicracy  or  dictatorship.    With  the  fall  of  the  Manchu  dynasty
in  1912,.  China  had  been  plagued  with  dissension,   division,   and
wa,rlordism.     In  the  late  1920's  the  picture  began  to  brighten
for  the  Chinese  people  as  a  more  stable  unified  government  under
the  Kuomini;ang  began  to  assert  itself  throughout  China.     In  1926
the  Kuomintamg  began  its  great  Northern  Expedition  against  the
northern  warlords,  notably  Sun  Ch'uan-fang  and  Chang  Tso-lin.
After  initia,1  success  in  the  field  of  battle  under  the  lea.der-
ship  of  Chiang  Kai-shek,   dissension  fast  developed  within  the
Chinese  na.tional  I.evolutionary  movement.     Soon  there  was  am  open
split  of  the  ''united  front,"  with  the  communists  directed  from
Moscow  and  the  nationalists  led  by  Chiang  Kai-shek.     The  bloody
purge  of  the  communists  initiated  by  Chiang  at  Shanghai  soon
si.7ept  many  parts   of  South  China.     However,   the  Northern  Expedii;ic>:`.
moved  onwards  to  the  north,   reaching  Peking  in  June,   1928.     The
(2)
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last  major  northern  warlord  threat  to  Chiang's  Nationalist
government  was  Chang  Tso-lin,  who  was  killed  by  a  Japanese-
planted  railroad  bomb  as  he  fled  northern  China  to  his  native
Manchuria.     Chang  Tso-1in  was  succeeded  by  his  son,   Chang  Hsueh-
liang,  who  soon  after  raised  his  banner  in  support  of  the  nation-
alist  cause.     Ironically,   some  eight  years  later  Marshal  Chang
Hsueh-liang  captured  Chiang  Kai-shek  and  forced  the  Nationalist-
Communist   "united  front''  opposing  the  Japanese.    But,   this  estab-
lishment  of  Nationalist  rule  from  Canton  to  Peking  in  1928  was
the  nearest  to  unification  China  had  ]mown  since  the  downfall
of  the  Manchu  empire.
The  years  from  1928  to  1937  were  not  peaceful  for  the  Kuo-
mintang  government.     There  were  still  sizable  al'eas  and  numerous
\
\
warlords  to  be  subdued  into  accepting  the  new  Nanking  leadership.
Chiang  Kai-shek  looked  on  the  communist  element  as  the  gI`eatest
domestic  threat  to  him  and  the  Nationalist  movement.     The  com-
munists  were  able  to  establish  a  rival  government  centered  in
Kiamgsi  Province  which  took  Chiang  some  five  major  military
campaigns,   between  1930  and  1934,   to  destroy.     Unfortunately
for  Ohiang  and  the  Kuomintang  the  fifth  ''bandit  suppression  cam-
paign,"  which  succeeded  in  the  capture  of  the  Kiangsi  Soviet
area,   failed  to  capture  the  communist  leadership,  who  escaped
to  the  northwest  in  the  now  famous   "long  march."     The  communists
again  were  successful  in  establishing  a  new  base  in  northern
Shensi  by  late  1935.     Immediately  Chiang  deployed  forces  in
hopes  of  final  destruction  of  his  domestic  foes.     The  army  de-
ployed  in  opposition  to  the  communists  at  Paoan  was  the  Man-
churian  army  under  the  young  Marshal  Chang  Hsueh-1ian8.     It  was
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at  his  encampment  near  Sian. thai;  Chiang  Kai-shek,  while  inspecting
his  troops,  was  capi;ured  by  this  young  marshal  on  December  12,
1936.     Out  of  this  capture  cane  the  Kuomintang-Communist   "united
front"  agreement  to  oppose  further  Japanese  aggression.
Japanese  aggression  was  indeed  real  enough  to  warrant  some
type  of  united  effort  by  the  Chinese.    China  had  clearly  rec-
ognized  Japan  as  her  major  foreign  menace  for  many  decades.
Just  before  the  coming  of  the  twentieth  century,   in  1895,   China
had  lost  a  war  to  Japan  and  by  the  Treaty  of  Shimonoseki  rec-
ognized  the  independence  of  Korea,   ceded  to  Japan  Formosa,   the
Pescadores  Islands,   i;he  Liaotung  Peninsula  of  Manchuria,  agreed
to  pay  a  large  indemnity,  and  opened  more  treaty  ports,     In
1904-1905  Japan  and  Russia  fought  a  major  war  over  the {.Chinese
territory  of  Manchuria  and  Japan. s  victory  signaled  further
encroachments  on  Chinese  territorial  integrity.    Japan  took
advantage  of  World  War  I  to  take  over  the  German  concessions
on  the  Shantung  Peninsula  and  to  issue  her  own  harsh  "twenty-
one  demands"  on  the  Chinese  goverrment.     Japan,  not  satisfied
with  her  dominant  position  in  Manchuria,   staged  the  Mukden
Incident  on  September  18,  1931,  when  she  felt  sufficient  to
completely  take  contl.ol  of  Manchuria,   expelled  the  Manchurian
army  of  Chang  Hsueh-1iang  and  later  created  the  "independent"
state  of  Manchukuo.    Unfori;unate  as  it  was  for  the  Chinese,
outside  world  opinion  was  content  with  using  moral  pressure
and  taking  such  action  as  nonl.ecognition  in  response  to  the
Japanese  aggression.    But  as  before,  more  territory  only  whetted
the  appetite  of  the  expansionist  Japanese,  and  soon  raids  and
advances   were  taking  place  south  of  the  "Great  Wall"  in  north
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China  proper.     It  was  one  of  these  actions,  Iiukouchiao  or  the
Marco  Polo  Bridge  Incident  on  July  7,  1937,  that  started  a  war
that  was  to  evolve  into  a  world  war  not  to  end  until  the  drop-
ping  of  ai;omic  bombs  in  1945.
Suffice  it  to  say  that  Japan  was  not  the  only  aggressor
nation  in  China.    Since  the  early  nineteenth  century  the  western
European  nations,  Russia,  and  even  the  United  States  had  been
creating  spheres  of  influence,  extracting  unequal  treaties  and
concessions  from  the  Chinese.     In  minry  ways,  Japan  was  only
following  the  lead  of  Europe  in  her  China  actions  and  policies.
Within  thirty  years  aLfter  the  Meiji  Restoration,  the  feudalistic
Japan  was  transformed  into  a  territor`; ,1,1  and  commercial  empire,
and  the  only  logical  place  for  expansion  at  the  time  was  on  the
badly  divided  and  weakened  Chinese  mainland.
The  United  States  had  become  deeply  involved  in  China  by
the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century.    This  nation  had  feared  the
complete  partitioning  of  the  decaying  Manchu  empire  unless  some
agreement  among  the  major  powers  with  commercial  interests  in
China  waLs  reached.     This  fear  of  being  closed  from  the  poten-
tially  great  ChinaL  market  initiated  Secretary  of  State  John  Hay's
nopen  door  notes."    The  first  note  of  1899  asked  for  agreement
on  the  guarantee  of  equal  trading  privileges  for  all  nations
and  that  treaty  ports  remain  open  to  all  parties.    The  second
note,  written  during  the  height  of  the  Boxer  Rebellion  of  1900,
went  much  further  as  stating  that  American  policy  was  to  "pre-
serve  Chinese  territorial  and  administrative  entity. "    RegaLrdless
of  how  permanent  or  serious  a  policy    these  "open  door  notes"
of  the  State  I)epartmeht  were  at  the  time,   they  becane  accepted
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as  a  basic  cornerstone  of  American  policy  toward  China.i    Again
in  1908,  with  the  Root-Takahira  Agreement  between  the  United
States  and  Japan  concerning  preservation  of  the status qE2  in
Asia,   the  policy  of  an  open  door  of  China  was  reiterated.2
Another  significant  act  of  American  diplomacy  toward  China
was  the  signing  of  the  Nine-Power  Treaty  at  the  Washington  Dis-
armament  Conference  of    1921-1922  by  the  United  States,   Great
Britain,  Japan,  France,  Italy,  China,  Portugal,  the  Netherlands,
and  Belgium.    All  of  the  signatories,  excepting  China  of  course,
agreed  ''to  respect  the  principle  of  the  open  door  in  the  Fa,r
East  and  to  refrain  from  using  the  unsettled  situation  in  China
to  advance  their  special  interests  at  the  expense  of  nationals
of  other  countries."3    This  treaty  proved  of  little  value  as
certainly  Japan  felt  little  bound  by  it  in her  later  actions,
while  other  members  took  no  action  in  opposition  to  Japan.     The
first  real  test  cane  when  Japan  created  the  puppet  Manchukuo
government.    Little  was  done  save  the  Iieague  of  Nations  which
sent  forth  the  Iiytton  Commission  which  condemned  Japan,   and  the
United  States  invoked  the  famed  Stimson  Doctrine  of  nonrecognition.
A  final  test  of  the  Nine-Power  Treaty  came  with  the  Iiukouchiao
Incident  of  July  7,  1937,  but  the  Japanese  aggression  continued.
LRobert  H.  Ferrell,
York:      W.W.   RTorton  and  a
2Ei£„  p.  417.
SERE.,   p.   572.
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Americans, other  than  those  employed  in  the  State  I)epa,rt-
ment  or  in  diplomatic  circles,  were  acquainted  with,   interested
in,   and  concerned  about  China  and  the  Chinese  people.     This  nation
had  been  sending  forth  sons  and  daughters  as  missionaries  to
teach  the  gospel  since  1829.     And  were  not  the  leader.s  of  China,
Chiang  Kai-shek,  and  his  wife,  the  former  Soong  Mei-1iang,
converted  to  Christianity  by  American  missionaries?    Americans
were  being  made  aware  of  China  and  her  people  by  the  writings
and  activities  of  people  such  as  Pearl  Buck  and  Henry  R.  Luce,
both  the  children  of  missionaries.     Just  as  many  Americans  were  I
aware  of  China  through  their  support  of  missionaries  and  their
widespread  reading  of  popular  literature,   some  Americans  had
a  fear  tha.i  Japan  was  the  major  American  rival  in  Asia}    As
early  as  the  first  Sino-Japanese  war  in  1895,  and  certainly  by
i;he  time  of  the  Russo-Japanese  war  and  the  following  period  of
''Yellow  Peril"  hysteria,  many  Americans  looked  on  Japan  as  a
chief  I.ival  and  perhaps  future  foe  of  America  and  her  policies.4
As  surely  as  Americans  were  interested  in  saving  souls,
they  were  probably  even  more  interested  in  making.  profits,  and
China  loomed  as  a  place  of  great  potential  market.    American
businessmen  were  probably  somewhat  blinded  by  the  vast  Chinese
nation  and  her  huge  population  of  a  potential  400,000,000
customer.s.     Perhaps  the  mere  idea  of  such  a  market  caused  our
4William  L.  Neunarm,   "Ambiguity  and  Ambivalence  in  Ideas
of  National  Interest  in  Asia"  in  Alexander  I)e  Oonde   (ed.)
Isola,tion  and  Securit.v.   (Durhan:     Duke  University.Press,1957),
pp.      8-3IT
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large  trade  with  Japan  to  .be  overlooked.     In  reality,  however,
by  1920,  America's  trade  with  Japan  was  much  larger  than  that
of  China.5    In  terms  of  both  exports  aLnd  imports  our  Japanese
trade  was  almost  half  of  all  our  Asian  trade  and  over  twice  as
large  as  our  China  trade  in  the  years  1920  until  1938.     In  fact,
"Japan  took  eighteen  percent  of  all  United  States  exports  and
supplied  six  and  one-half  percent  of  all  United  States  imports."6
The  United  States  was  the  worldls  best  customer  of  the  Japanese,
and  in  turn  Japan  was  the  third  best  customer  of  the  United
States.   China  was  down  the  list,  being  our  seventeenth  best
customer.7
Iiikewise  the  major  American  investments  in  Asia  were  in
Japan.     In  1935,  Americans  had  $750,000,000  invested  in  China,
Japan,  the  Philippine  Islands,  and  Malaysia.    Of  this  anount
more  was  invested  in  Japan  than  in  the  rest  of  Asia.    Great
Britain  was  the  primary  investor  in  Asia  with  a  larger  Chinese
investment  than  that  the  United  States  had  in  all  of  Asia.    For
every  dollar  Anericams  had  invested  in  China,  the  British  had
5Equ.,   pp.135-136.
York:68::uf(:cfii:u=S6o#an#i
1omac in  Eastern  Asia.
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seven.    Also  the  Japanese  had  larger  investments  in  Manchuria
than  the  United  States  had  in  all  of  Asia.8
The  United  States  government,   just  as  big  business,  was
viewing  the  great  potential  Chinese  market.     In  May,  1933,  an
early  depression  year  with  outside  markets  in  prime  demand,
the  Reconstruction  Finance  Corporation  granted  a  $50,000,000
wheat  and  cotton  credit  to  the  Chinese  govel.nment.     This  credit
failed  to  create  the  market  for  American  products  that  was
desired,   and  the  Chinese  wel.e  for.ced  to  cancel  the  credit  in
April,  1935,  because  of  their  inability  to  dispose  of  these
goods.    Of  this  credit,  at  the  time  of  cancellation,   only  $17,
105,385  had  been  used.9    America,n  goverrment  aLnd  private  enter-
prise  were  interested  in  the  development  of  commercial` aviation
in  China,  and  the  mar.ket  that  could  be  created.     In  1932-33  a
number  of  American  aviation  instructors,  with  cooperation  of
private  industry  and  the  Aeronautics  Trade  Division  of  the
Coinerce  Department,   established  training  schools  for  Chinese
pilots  at  Hangchow  and  at  Canton,  but  by  June,  1935,   the  contract
for  American  instructors  at  the  Hangchow  school  was  allowed  to
expire.     Other  aviation  investments  in  the  mid-1930's  were  the
Curtiss-Wright  Corporation' s  construction  of  a  fivermillion-
dollar  airplane  assembly  plant  in  China,  which  was  later  moved
inland  due  to  the  war,  and  the  acquiring  by  Pan-American  AirwaLys
of  shares  in  the  China  National  Aviation  Corpol.ation  in  1935.
8EEi!.,  pp.   515-516
Insti::teA;fB±:::¥icffi:r±C±;=s±9Eife.±3±±ai;:    (New York:
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Ihis  interest  in  Chinese  aviation  is  evident  as  the  ''sale  of
American  aircraft  and  accessories  to  China,  including  military
planes,   had  risen  from  $157,515  in  1932  to  $1,762,247  in  l933.WL°
Just  as  the  importance  of  the  Chinese  market  was  looked
on  by  businessmen  as  potentially  great,  so  the  United  States
goverrment  placed  major  Asian  diplomatic  importance  on  China.
John  V.  A.  MacMurray,   chief  of  the  Far  Eastern  Division  of  the
State  Department,   once  concluded:
...  our  goverrment  policy  as  well  as  popular  opinion
put  China  at  the  center  of  its  thinking  on  Far  Eastern
g#a±::=I;pi:e:tp:::e :=o:: #:i:hm:::E p¥fa:¥::y:H
Surely  this  statement  on  the  position  of  China  in  American
foreign  policy  has  some  validity  as:
1
The  earliest  trans-Pacific  trade  had  centered  on  China,
and  it  was  in  China  that  the  first  American  commercial
interests  were  estaLblished.    American  religious  and
philanthropic  groups  gave  the  Chinese  the  greaLtest
attention,    The  cornerstone  of  American  Far  Eastern
::I:%¥6n:h:±%Ee8h:£:=|2°ncept.  had  its  origi|is  in
|OIbid.
____
LLNeunarm,   WAmbiguii;y  and  Ambivalence  in  Idias  of  National
Interest  in Asia,''  p.135.
12Ibid.
Chapter  11
UNITED  STATES   P0IilcY  FROM   THE
LUKOUCHIA0   INCIDENT   TO   THE   BRUSSELS   CONFERENCE
On  the  night  of  July  7,   1937,   a  seemingly  common  event
I
in  the  long  series  of  Sino-Japanese  hostile  incidents  occurred.
But  this  event,  which  came  to  be  known  to  the  western  world
as  the  Marco  I'olo  Bridge  Incident,   took  on  a  snowballing  effect
that  both  the  Chinese  and  Japanese  seemed  either  unable  or  un-
willing  to  slow  or  settle.    At  fil'st,  most  of  the  world  mis-
judged  the  event  taking  place  in  north  China  and  looked  on  it
as  just  another  Asian  incident,  not  nearly  as  important  as
those  then  taking  place  in  Europe.1    Many  people  believed  that
China would  act  as  she  had  in  the  past  and  put  up  little  resis-
tance  to  Japanese  acts  of  aggression.    After  all,  China  had
Lwaldo  H.   Heinrichs,   American  Ambassador.:
#s#:P-i-::-E-i=-,?-§=E=f=.g¥
(11)
a.   GrewHiH.
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done  little  to  nothing  in  a  series  of  Japanese  aggressions  from
the  invasion  of  Manchuria,  Jehol  Province,  and  actions  south  of
the  Great  Wall,  why  would  she  offer  resistance  at  this  new
aggression?2    Therefore,  world  eyes  were  on  the  rise  of  the
German  and  Italian  totalitarian  regimes,  failure  of  the  Iieague
of Nations  and  of  the  Kellogg-Braiad  Pact,  the  Italian-Ethio-
pian  crisis  and  the  Spanish  Civil  War.    With  indifference  Amer-
icans  viewed  these  world  events,  as  isolationism  grew  stronger.3
Not  only  were  the  European  events  preoccupying  the  American
public  but  domestic  issues  largely  overshadowed  this  north  China
affair.    PI'esident  Roosevelt  was  caught  in  the  midst  of  his
supreme  court  bill  with  all  its  debate,  and  there  was  the  new
stronger  neutrality  legislation  passed  after  the  famedl, munitions
bearings,   so  that  events  in  China  indeed  seemed  very  remote  to
the  maLjority  of  Americans.4
Unfortunately  for  China,  Japan,  and  the  world,  the  Marco
Polo  Bridge  incident  did  not  become  just  another  event  as  the
Japanese  invasion  continued  and  the  fighting  spread  to  the  Shang-
hai  area  by  mid-August,  1937.5    As  the  Sino-Japanese  hostilities
spread  and  continued,  the  United  States  government  was  faced
2Russell  D.  Buhite,
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with  some  basic  decisions  to  be  made.     Of  prime  importance  was
the  question  of  protection  of  American  citizens  and  property
in  China,  should  the  neutrality  legislation  be  invoked.    See-
retary  of  State  Hull  was  asked  if  the  JaLpanese  actions  were  a
violation  of  the  Nine-Power  Treaty  of  1922.    In  an  off-the-
record  press  conference  of  July  16,  1937,  he  responded  that
sufficient  information  was  not  available  to  place  blame  on  one
party  or  the  other,  and  that  we  were  doing  all  possible  in
urging  a  peaceful  settlement.6    But  "underlying  these  immediate
issues  was  the  basic  question  of  whether  the  United  States
could  lstay  out  of  warl  by  pursuing  the  isolationist  policy  im-
plicit  in  the  neutralit.y  legislation  or  by  cooperaLting  where
feasible  with  other  nations  to  halt  aggression  and  prevent  the
outbreak  of  general  war.W7    Evidently  this  nation  decided  not
to  follow  either  concept  entirely.    Secretary  Hull  rejected  a
Chinese  appeal  that  we  act  as  a  mediator  as  we  had  done  for
Rus;ia  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  on  the  ground  thaLt  such  action
would  only  anger  the  Japanese  and  make  their  military  faction
stronger.8    Also  Hull  rejected  a  bid  by  the  British  for  an  Anglo-
American  mediation  on  July  12,   1937.     Great  Britain  brought  up
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the  end  of  July  but  Washington  remained  silent.9    However,   on
July  21,  1937,   Secretary  Hull  did  call  in  Chinese  Ambassador
Wamg  Oheng-t'ing  aLnd. Japanese  Ambassador  Saito  for  separate
conversations  at  the  State  Department.    Hull  informed  both
parties  that  the  United  States  ''was  I.eady  and  would  gladly  do
anything  short  of  mediation-which would  require  the  agreement
of both parties  in  advance-to  contribute  in  a  fair  and  im-
partial  way  toward  composing  the  matter  of  controversy  between
China  and  Japan. nL°
Also,   Secretary  Hull  instructed  Ambassador  Grew  in  Japan
on  August  10,   1937,   to  inform  the  Japanese  that  the  United
States  would  offer  its  good  offices  toward  the  settlement  of
the  Sino-Japanese  dispute.     The  Japanese  failed  to  respond  to
this  invitation,  and  no  similar  approach  wa,s  made  toward  the
Chinese,   as  the  department  felt  nothing  was  to  be  gained.LL
The  State  Department  was  trying  hard  to  be  neutral  in
handling  the  crisis  from  a  stand=point  of  diplomacy,  yet  public
opinion  was  not  quite  that  neutral.    A    Gallup  poll  taken  in
August,  1937,   showed  some  fifty-five  percent  of  the  public
polled  feeling  completely  neutral,  forty-three  percent  favoring
the  Chinese,   and  only  two  percent  in  favor  of  Japan.12    The
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poll  showed  that  a  small  majority  did  refuse  to  take  sidesand
was,  in  fact,  neutral.    However  a  large  minority  clearly  fa-
vored  China,  with  little  sympai;hy  for  Japan  even  registered.
As  the  hostilities  in  Asia  continued,  Americans,  Chinese,
Japanese,  and  others  looked  to  President  Roosevelt  to  see  if
the  recently  passed  neutl.ality  legislation would  be  put  into
effect.     In  1935  there  had  been  strong  public  support  for  an
embargo  on  the  export  of  arms  to  belligerents  with  the  idea
that  such  action  would  keep  this  nation  free  from  involvement
in  foreign  wars.    Because  of  this  strong  feeling,  a  joint  res-
olution  of  Congress  was  passed  in  August,   1935,  which  provided
that  when  the  president  should  find  a  state  of  war  to.  exist
among  two  or  more  foreign  states,   it  would  be  illegal  to  export
arms,   ammunition,   or  implements  of  ,war.     Also  this  1935  legis-
lation  provided  for  the  licensing  of  arms  exports,  the  prohibi-
tion  of  i;ransport  on  United  States  owned  vessels,  and  the
I.estriction  of  travel  by  American  citizens  on  belligerent  ships.L3
Since  1935,   Congress  had  added  the  cash  and  carry  provisions  to
this  neutrality  legislation,  which,  in  effect,  prevented  Amer-
icans  from  selling  goods  to  belligerents  on  credit.    Also  new
provisions  made  it  illegal  for  American  ships  to  trade  with
nations  at  war.    President  Roosevelt  realized  that  if  this
legislation  were  invoked  Japan  would  stand  to  benefit  while
China  would  be  more  penalized.     Japan  possessed  the  necessary
capital  to  make  purchases  and  had  the  necessary  transportation,
while  China  lacked  the  transport  facilities  and  the  necessary
13Dept.   of  Statei Peace ± Hg,  p.  24.
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finances.14    President  Roosevelt  realized  that  Japan  manufactured
her  own  arms  and  munitions  and  her  imports  from  the  United  States
consisted  of  items  such  as  oil,   cotton,  iron,   scrap,  etc.,   items
very  necessary  to  a  defense  industry  but  still  not  specifically
listed  in  the  neutrality  legislai;ion.    Any  attempt  to  embargo
other  items  would  have,required  action  by  the  Congress  and  there
was  the`  matter  of  the  most  favored-nation-clause  in  the  AmericaLn-
Japanese  Commercial  Treaty  of  1911  to  consider.15
Because  of  these  basic  inequalities  in  the  neutrality  leg-
islation  and  the  ambiguity  in  its  wording,  I'resident  Roosevelt
decided  on  August  16,  1937,   ''to  withhold  a  neutrality  procla-
mation  until  China  and  Japan  formally  declared  war  against  each
other."    This  gradually  be`came  hardened  policy  as  no  declaration
of  war  from  either  party  was  forthcoming.L6    The  decision  by
President  Roosevelt;  hot `to  invoke  the  legislation  was  not  in
keeping  with  his  e'arlier  actions.    He  had  invoked  the  legislation
when  faced  with  the  Italian  invasion  of  Ethiopia,  and  issued  the
following  statement,   ''We  are  acting  to  simplify  definitions  and
facts  by  calling  war  'war'  when  armed  invasion  and  a  resulting
killing  of  hirman  beings  takes  place."    President  R®osevelt  ad-
mitted  in  an  off-therrecord  press  conference  in April,  1938,
and  Secretary  Hull  did  likewise  in  his Memoirs  that  their
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decisions  were  reached  for  reasons  of  trying  to  assist  China
and  that  the  legislation  would  not  have  harmed  Japan.L7
Thus  the  Presidentls  policy  of  finding  no  existing  war
was  made  possible  because  China  refrained  from  a  declaration
of  war,  .]mowing  she  would  suffer  from  the  impending  embargo,
while  Japan  probably  feared  that  raw  materials  used  in  armament
production  might  be  added  to  the  list  and  also  embargoed.L8
President  Roosevelt  found  support  of  this  course  of  action
when  Senator  Pittman,   chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations
Committee,   issued  a  statement  on  July  29,   1937,   that  armed
conflict  did  not  necessarily  mean  that  there  was  a  state  of
war  in  existence.    He  also  stated  that  the  President  by  not
enacting  the  neutrality  legislation  could  probably  do  pore  to
resolve  the  conflict.    Throughout  July  newspaper  editorials
and  public  opinion  seemed  to  favor  the  President's  course  of
action,  but  after  the  war  spread  to  the  Shanghai  area  a  change
in  feeling  was  registered.    Senators  Nye  and  Clark  urged  that
the  legislation  be  applied  even  though  ii;  might  be  to  Japanls
benefit.    Also  twenty-four  members  of  the  House  of  Represent-
atives  ul.ged  that  action  be  ta,ken  ''to  protect  this  country
against  becoming  involved  in  the  Far  Eastern  war."    Soon  there-
after  President  Roosevelt  and  Congress  came  under  strong  pressure
as  letters,   telegrans,   etc.,  began  to  pour  in  demanding  action.L9
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State  Department  officials  and  foreign  office  officials  of
both  Chiria  and  Japan  were  curious  as  to  what  role  President
Roosevelt  would  take  or  be  pressured  into.     On  August  6,  1937,
Ambassador  Grew  in  Tokyo,  wired  Secretary  Hull  that  the  Japanese
Foreign Minister  had  asked  about  the  neutrality  legislation.
Grew  reported  that  his  reply  vTas  to  point  out  that  this  was  a
''domestic  mat;ter  and  its  interpreta,tion  by  foreigners  is  diffi-
cult.n2°    on  August  16,1937,  the  Secretary  of  State  requested
that  Ainbassador  Nelson  I.  Johnson  in  China  say  what  the  probable
Chinese  reaction  would  be  to  the  application  of  the  neutrality
laws.21  Ainbassador  Johasonls  message  in  reply  to  Hull  stated  that
the  Chinese  would  be  upset  and  that  their  reactions  could  make
it  dangerous  for  American  citizens  in  China.22    Ambassador
Johnson  advised  against  the  enacting  of  the  neutrality  legis-
lation,  and  stated  that  China hoped  for  material  assistance,
feeling  that  they  were  protecting American  and  British  interests
in  their  opposition  to  Japanese  aggression.23    Secretary  Hull
replied  to  his  Ambassador  in  China  on  September  15,  1937,   that:
''Two  particular  objectives  of  our  present  policy  and  course  of
action  with  regard  to  the  Far  Eastern  situation  are:   (i)  To  keep
this  country  a,t  peace,  and  (2)  To  safeguard  the  lives  of  American
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nationals.W24    Meanwhile  Ambassador  Grew  in  Tokyo  was  informing
the  State  I)epartment  on  September  7,   1937,   that  he  believed  Japan
would  take  "drastic  measures  to  prevent  supply  of  amis  for  China.'l
He  did  not  believe  our  interest;  in  China  would  be  worth  the  risk
of  our  possible  involvement.25     So  we  can  see  that  our  two  ambaLs-
sadors  were  in  disagl`eement,  Ambassador  Johnson  not  wanting  neu-
trality  declared  and  Ambassador  Grew  desiring  strict  application
of  the  neutrality  laws.
Even  if  Presider.i  Roosevelt  was  able  to  avoid  invoking  of
the  neutra,lity  legislation,  public  pressure  was  mounting  and
some  action  seemed  necessary  to  keep  the  nation  free  from  involve-
ment  in  the  Asian  hostilities.     Two  areas  that  could  possibly
lead  to  American  involvement  were  the  American  aviation  in-
structors  sel'ving  China,  and  the  carrying  trade  of  implements
of  war  on  United  States  fla,g  and  goverrmentcowned  vessels.     As
early  as  August  15,   1937,   Consul  General  Gauss  aLt  Shanghai
reported  to  Secretary  Hull  that  American  aviation  instructors
were  serving  China.26    The  official  view  from  Washington  was
that  it  was  illegal  for  American  citizens  to  advise  and  instruct
military  persormel,   aviation  or  otherwise.27    The  United  States
Consul  at  Hong  Kong,   Donovan,   reported  to  Secretary  Hull  on
August  21,   1937,   that  efforts  were  being  made  to  keep  American
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aviators  from  joining  the  Chinese.28    Ambassador  Johnson  informed
Secretary  Hull  on  September  I,   1937,   from  Nanking  that  Madame
Chian`g  Kai-shek,  who  was  in  charge  of  Chinese  air force  admin-
istration,  was  upset  concerning  the  handling  of  American  aviators
as  she  pointed  out  that  this  was  not  neutral  because  the  neu-
trality  law  was  not  in  effect  and  because  Italy  and  Germany
were  still  contributing  to  Chinals  defensive  efforts.29    Sec-
retary  Hull's  reply  to  Ambassador  Johnson  on  September  7,1937,
was  for  the  Ambassador  to  tell  Madame  Chiang  that  the  United
States  did  not  approve  of  its  citizens  being  involved  in  foreign
Wars.30
President  Roosevelt  took  action  concerning  the  transport
of  munitions  to  the  Asian  belligerents  on  United  States  owned
vessels  in  the  following  press  release  issued  by  the  Depart-
ment  of  State   on  September  14,   1937:
Merchant  vessels  owned  by  the  Governmeni;  of  the  United
States  will  not  hereafter,  until  further  notice,  be
permitted  to  transpol.t  to  China  or  Japan  any  of  the
arms,   ammunition  or  implements  of  war  which  were
listed  in  the  President's  proclama,tion  of  May  i,1937.
Any  other  merchant  vessels,   flying  the  American  flag,
which  attempt  to  transport  any  of  the  listed  articles
to  China  or  Japan  will  until  further  notice,  do  so  at
their  own  risk.    The  question  of  applying  the  Neutral-
i:¥a±£:n=e::i:S2±:h:::tE:s:::5ithe  GOverrment  policy
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Thus,  the  Secretary  of  State  informed  Ambassador  Johnson  in
China  of  Rooseveltls  recent  decision  in  a  message  on  September  15,
1937.32
Almost  immediately  this  policy  was  put  into  effect  in  the
case  of  the  SS  Wichita.     The  Wichita  had  sailed in  August  from
an  eastcoast  port  with nineteen  Bellanca  airplanes  purchased
by  China.     This  ship  waLs  owned  by  the  federal  government  but
operated  under  a  charter  to  a  private  company. When  the  Wichita
called  on  San  Pedro,  California,  before  starting  her  Pacific
run  the  planes  were  unloaded  in  accordance  with  the  latest
decision.33    The  JapaLnese  had  proclaimed  aL  blockade    against
Chinese  shipping  on  August  25,  1937.34    Probably  the  President
I
wished  to  avoid  trouble  from  Japan  and  domestic  pressure
from  isolationist  and  pacifist  groups  that  helped  bring  on  the
decision.35
This  action  taken  by  President  Roosevelt  had  more  far
reaching  effects  than  one  at  first  might  realize.    The  goverrment
owned  only  four  vessels  engaged  in  the  Asian  trade,  but  the  warn-
ing  to  private  companies  that  they  operated  at  their  own  risk
`.ras  detrimental  to  the  Chinese.     Trade  with  Japan  was  almost
risk  free  but  trade  with  China was  full  of  risk  in  the  face  of
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Japanese  sea  power  and  their  proclaimed  blockade.36    This  is
evideni;  in  examination  of  the  values  of  licenses  on  war  materials
issued  in  the  years  1937  and  1938  to  Japan  and  China.    IIicenses
for  goods  to  Japan  increased  from  Sl,  173,942  for  the  year
ending  November  30,   1937,   to  $9,241,282  for  the  year  ending
November  30,   1938,  while  for  China  the  total  increased  from
$6,057,093  as  of  November  30,   1937  to  $9,180,800  ending  Nov-
ember  30,   1938.37
The  Chinese  government  did  register  a  protest  on  the
Wichita case   on  September  17,1937.38     0n  September  22,1937,
a  representative  of  the  Bellanca  Airplane  Company  asked  the
State  I)epartment  if  it  would  be  permissible  to  ship  the  nine-
teen    airplanes,  which  had been  removed  from  the  Wichita bya
foreign  flag  vessel.39    The  planes  were  finally  reshipped
aboard  a  European  vessel  to  China.4°    The  Chinese  also  tried
to  obtain  arms  and  munitions  from  the  du  Pont  Company  and
Remington.     These  compaLnies  asked  the  State  Department  if  this
would  be  permitted,   and  the  department  approved  as  long  as  the
proper  license  was  obtained.4L    However,   several  companies,
du  Font  in  particular,  were  very  hesitant  to  sell  to  China.
36Bissoni
37Atwateri
America's  Far  Eastern
Amel'ican
38Tones  and  }fyers|
I)01icy,   p.   70.
Regulation  ££  ±=Eg  Exports,  p.   229.
Documents
39gEE£,  RE,   IV.   537-538.
4°Tones  and  ]fyersi Documents
4LEEES,  RE,   IV.   536-537.
I   I.   535-536.
I.   536.
23
They  feared  public  opinion  after  the  national  debate  concerning
our  entry  into  World  War  I  and  the  ''merchants  of  deathw  ideas.42
Almost  as  much  controversy  was  generated  in  this  country
over  the  protection  of  American  cii;izens  as  there  was  about
neutrality.    The  first  response  was  to  reinforce  the  American
military  contingent  at  Shanghai  where  the  majority  of  American
citizens  were  located.     On  August  17,   1937,   the  Navy  Department
announced  in  a  press  release  i;hat  1,200  marines  in  the  trams-
port USS  Charmont  had departed  Sam  Diego  for  Shanghai  being
accompanied  by  the  light cruiser  USS  Mar.blehead.43    I,ater  as  the
fighting  shifted  to  the  Shanghai  area  and  the  passenger  liner SS
President  Hoover  was accidentally  bombed  by  the  Chinese,   the
mood  began  to  change  and  there  was  pressure  for  American  with-
drawal  from  China..     Accol.dingly  on  September  3,   1937,   a  warning
was  issued  for  American  citizens  to  leave  Shanghai  and  on  Sept-
ember  5,   1937,   I'resident  Roosevelt  stated  that  those  who  remained
in  Shanghai  did  so  at  their  own  risk.44    IIater  Vice-President
Garner  requested  from  the  State  Department  information  concern-
ing  the  numbers  of  American  civilian  and  military  personnel  in
China.     Secretary  Hull  replied  to  the  Vice-President  on  January  8,
1938,   that  in  July,   1937,   there  were  10,500  American  citizens
residing  in  China  and  as  of  November  6,   1937,   the  number  had
decreased  to  6,000.     The  military  was  distributed  as  follows:
Peiping  (U.S.   Marines)  -  528,   Tientsin  (U.S.   Arny)   -814,   Shanghai
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(U.S.   Marines)  -2,555   (1,500  of  these  being  on  temporary  duty),
arid  the  U.S.  Navy  had  some  forty-four  vessels  containing  i,800
officers  and  men  in  the  Asiatic Squadron.     Of  this  number  nine
gunboats  with  965  officers  and  men  were  serving  on  Chinese
rivers.45
Soon  after  this  information  was  provided  to  Vice-President
Garner,  American  withdrawal  began  in  China.     The  first  with-
drawal  was  announced  in  a  Department  of  State  press  release
on  February  4,  1938.     The  Fifteenth  Infantry  was  being  with-
dra\m  from  Tientsin.    However,   to  tempora.rily  fill  this  void
two  companies  of  Marine  guards  were  shifted  from  Peiping  to
Tientsin.46    This  slowed  but  did  continue  almost  up  until  the
attach-  on  I'earl  Harbor.
The  American  government  and  her  citizens  had  more  in  mind
than  self-interest  in  avoiding  being  caught  up  in  the  conflict.
There  was  real  concern  by  the  government  and  the  public  for
the  Chinese  in  their  latest  tragedy.    We  may  have  taken  all
precautions  to  avoid  involvement  in  the  conflict,  but  we  were
quick  to  offer  aLnd  give  medical  and  humanitarian  assistance.
Alnbassador  Johnson  informed  Secretary  Hull  on  September  8,   1937,
that  medical  supplies  of  all  kinds  were  needed  for  both  refugees
and  soldiers.     He  reported  that  the  supplies  were  needed  to  com-
bat  the  spread  of  epidemics  such  as  cholera,   dysentery,  and
typhoid.     The  Ambassador  went  on  to  suggest  that  the  National
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followed  up  when  Secretary  Hull  wired  the  Consul  General  at
Shanghai,  Gauss,  asking  what  assistance  the  Unii;ed  States  could
give  and  what  supplies  were  available  there  from  Red  Cross  and
American  military  sources.    Action  was  then  taken  by  the  Advisor
on  Political  Relations  of  the  State  I)epartment,  Hornbeck,  who
instructed  the  chief  of  the  Division  of  Far  Eastel'n  Affairs,
Hamilton,   to  \send  Army  and  Navy  surplus  supplies.     Secretary
/
Hull  next  informed  Ambassador  Johnson  that  Admiral  Grayson,  Chair-
man  of  the  American  Red  Cross  had  appropriated  Sloo,OO0  for  med-
ical  and  hospital  supplies.     On  October  28,   1937,  Ambassador
Johnson  recommended  to  the  State  Department  what  supplies  and
in  what  quantities  the  appropriated  fund  should  go  towards.47
Iiater,   on  JanuaLry  17,   1938,   President  Roosevelt  made  a
public  appeal  to  Admiral  Grayson  of  the  American  Red  Cross  and
to  the  American  public  to  do  more  to  aid  the  suffering  of  the
Chinese.    He  asked  that  this  offering  be  as  much  as  one  million
dollars.48    The  American  public  did  respond  to  this  plea  and
supplies  valued  at  over  Sl,OOO,000  were  sent  to  China  in  the
period  between  the   summer  of  1937  through  September.  of  1940.
After  October,   1940,   the  program  increased  greatly  aLnd  some
$2,goo,000  in  assistance  was  delivered  in  the  next  thirteen
months  into  free  and  Japanese  occupied  China.49
47¥, ¥,  |v.  627-637.
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0n  September  12,   1937,   China  appealed  to  the  Iieague  of
Nations  for  some  type  of  assistance  in  her  fight  against  Jap-
anese  aggression.    At  least  at  the  Ijeague  China  would  have
access  to  a  forum  in  which  to  plead  her  case  to  the  world  and
perhaps  assistance  would  be  forthcoming.     The  Iieague  Council
referred  the  Chinese  appeal  on  to  an  advisory  committee  which
had  been  established  in  1933  to  deal  with  the  Manchurian
incident.    An  American  representative  met  and  sat  on  this
committee  but  had  no  vote  as  the  United  States  had  refused  to
join  the  IIeague.5°     On  September  28,   1937,   Secretary  Hull  sent
instructions  to  Minister  Harrison  in  Switzerland,  who  repre-
sented  i;he  Unii;ed  States  in  the  Ijeaguels  proceedings.     In  his
instructions,  Hull  stated  that  China  wa,s  willing  for  negotiations
but  Japanls  intention  was  to   "destroy  the  Chinese  will  and
capacity  to  resist  and  to  overthrow  the  exisi;ing  Chinese  Gov-
ernment."    Secretary  Hull  continued  in  his  instructions  to  give
his  view  tha.t  the  situation  was  not  one  of  broken  treaties
but  basic  "questions  of  international  law,  of  humanity,  of  war
and  of  peace."5L    In  these  instructions  the   ''moral  persuasion"
approach  to  diplomacy  is  clearly  drawn  out..    The  United  States
policy  would  be  one  of  independent  action,  refusing  to  join
in  joint  actions  with  other  nations.52
Thile  the  Iieague  was  debating  the  Sino-Japanese  problem,
President  Roosevelt  delivered  his  controversial  ''Quarantine
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Speech"  at  Chicago  on  October  5,   1937.53     The  President  spoke
in  vague  terms  of  the  need  for  quarantine  of  the  aggressor
nations  of  the  world.    Perhaps  the  President  had  no  definite
plan  of  quarantine  in  mind  but  was  only  looking  for  v7ays  of
dealing  with  international  problems.54    Whatever  the  President
had  in  mind,  he  did  not  condemn  any  nation  by  none 'and  was
seeking  a  solution  for  world  peace.55    |t  is  significant  that
the  President  picked  isolationist  Chicago  for  his  address,  the
speech  came  under  immediaLte  attack  from  the  isolationist  elements
and  no  action  was  taken  nor  the  speech  followed  up.56    The  Japanese
did  not  fail  to  take  notice  of  the  speech.Ahbassador  Grew  states
that  Japan  believed  the  United  States  the  "only  genuinely  impartial
country  during  the  hostilites  between  Japan  and  China|  until  the
moment  of  the  Presidentls  Chicago  speech  on  October  5,1937.W57
0n  October  6,  1937,   the  Iieague  adopted  a  resolution
declaI.ing  ''moral  support"  for  the  Chinese  and  urged  the  IIeague's
member  nations  not  to  take  actions  to  weaken  Chinals  resistance.
The  Iieague  then  went  on  to  ask  member  nations  to  consider
independent  assistance  to  the  Chinese.58    Also  in  the  Leaguels
53An  excellent  analysis  of  the  speech  is  found  in  Dorottry.
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resolution  was  the  recommendation  that  members  of  the  Nine-
Power  Treaty,  Washington  1922,   ''seek  a  method  of  putting  an
end  to  the  Sino-Japanese  conflict  by  agreement."    The  United
States  endorsed  the  League.s  resolution  of  ''moral  support"  for
China  but  refused  to  have  recourse  to  the  Nine-Power  Treaty
Conference  in Washington  as  suggested  by  the  British.    Instead
Brussels  was  suggested  as  a  site  for  the  conference,  and  it  was
set  for  November  3,   1937.59
President  Roosevelt  announced  in  an  address  of  October  12,
1937,   "the  sole  purpose  of  American  policy  at  the  Brussels
conference  would  be  to  cooperate  with  China  and  Japan  to  seek
an  end  to  the  fighting."60    Japan refused  to  take  part  in  the
Brussels  conference,  aLnd  the  Soviet  Union  accepted  an  +nvitation
to  attend  as  a  special  guest.    It  was  this  non-member  nation,
the  Soviet  Union,  which  was  the  only  party  willing  to  take  con-
crete  action  in  opposition  to  Japanese  aggression.    The  only
action  by  other  attendants,  including  the  United  States,  Great
Britain,  and  France,  was  to  call  for  a  peaceful  settlement.61
Because  of  the  very  weak  position  taken  by  the  United  States,
the  talks  ended  in  complete  failure.    President  Roosevelt  was
unwilling  to  take  "strong  action  against  the  Japanese  unless
and until  isolationist  opinion  in  the  United  States  altered
radically.w62
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Immediately  after  the  Brussels  Conference,  China  approached
the  United  States,  Great  Britain,  and  France  for  a  loan  of
$500,000,000  to  purchase  war  materials.     The  loan  was  to  be
secured  on  customs,   salt  revenues,   and  oil  concessions.     The
proposal  was  quite  large  but  entirely  realistic  considering
the  Chinese  situation  at  the  time.    The  idea  received  little
consideration  from  the  said  Powers,   and  therefor.e  was  dropped.63
Just  as  the  United  States  prestige  went  dovm  in  Japan  after  the
quarantine  speech,   so  it  did  likewise  in  China  after  our  weak
show  at  the  League  and  at  Brussels.     Dr.  Wellington  Koo,   the
Chinese  repl`esentative  at  Brussels,  remarked  on  the  Nine-Power
Conference  that  the  British  remained  friends  of  China,  but  the
United  States  had  let  his  country  doun.64                            i
The  outbreak  of  the  second  Sino-Japanese  War  in  1937
caught  the  United  States  without  a  real  policy  to  put  into
effect.    The  neutrality  legislation  was  available  but  i;he  Pres-
ident  saw  fit  to  see  that  it  should  not  be  enacted.     Instead
our  policy  became  one  of  wait  and  see,   the   ''24  hour"  policy.
American  action  concerning  the  shipping  of  munitions  on  United
States  flag  vessels  proved  to  favor  the  Japanese  and  to  restrict
China.     The  American  public  showed  willingness  and  eag`erness  to
give  China  zT,edical  and  humanitarian  assistance  but  was  unwilling
to  take  stronger  measures.     In  fact  the  primary  object  of  Amer-
ican  policy  in  the  months  that  followed  the  Marco  I'olo  Bridge
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incident  was  to    keep  out  of  the  conflict.65    Secretary  Hull.s
moral  approach  proved  to  be  the  nation's  only  policy  at  the
meeting  of  the  Ijeague  aLnd  at  the  Brussels  Conference.66    Our
ambassadors  in  the  respective  countries  were  of  divided  opin-
ion  as  usual,  Ambassador  Johnson  feeling  that  China  was  indeed
fighting  for  the  ''west"  and  correct  in  calling  on  the  Iieague
and  signatories  of  the  Nine-Power  TI.eaty  and  Kellogg-Briand
Pact.67    Meanwhile,  Ambassador  Grew  wanted  strict  American
neutrality  so  as  to  avoid  entanglement  in  the  affair.68    Perhaps
one  reason  for  the  weaker  action  by  other  nations  was  the
Japanese  threat  to  ''I.ide  roughshod  over  their  interest  and
properties  in  China"  if  sanctions  were  imposed.69    At  any
rate  the  Brussels  Conference  proved  to  be  the  last  good  chance
for  peace  in  Asia.7°    One  prominent  government  official  at
the  time  and  later  historian  corments  thai;:
When  in  July  1937,   the  Japanese  Army  marched  into
China,  we  were  trying  to  make  foreign  policy  out
of  morality  and  neutrality  alone.    Ihese  neither
:::V::£:do:h:e:±¥::tw:fht=::::=e?9f  Provided  effect-
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Chapter  Ill
EUROPE  AND  TEE   SINO-JAPANESE  WAR,   1937-1941
Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek  dismissed  his  Russian
military  advisors  in  1927  from  the  Kuomintang  as  the  communist
element  of  the  movement  was  being  purged  and  later  in  the  next
decade  obtained  the  services  of  a  German  mission.i  Probably  a
German  mission  was  sought  because  Chiang  purchased  arms  in  that
nation  and  the  reputation  of  past  Prussian  military  machines.
A  military  mission  from  the  United  States  was  not  sought  be-
cause  the  military  of  this  nation  was  weak,  under  strength,
and  unimpressive.2     Germany  was  glad  to  provide  the  mission
because  it  created  a  market  for  military  equipment  and  re-
established  sor.r,e  Germari  influence  in  Asia  which  had  been  lost
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as  a  result  of  World  War  I.     Germany  was  able  to  play  a  large
role  in  the  development  of  Chinese  commercial  aviation  by  the
formation  of  the  Eurasia  Company  in  1930.     This  company  was
owned  two-thirds  by  the  Chinese  government  and  one-third  by
German  IiufthansaL.     The  purpose  of  the  airline  was  to  provide  a
connecting  air  link  with  Europe  through  central  Asia,  but  this
proved  improbable  and  the  airline  operated  as  a  domestic  carrier.3
.       The  German  govel.nment  sent  some  of  her  finest  and  most
noted  officers  to  serve  in  the  mission.     General  Von  Seeckt
arrived  as  head  of  the  mission  in  1933  and  was  succeeded  by
General  Alexander  von  Falkenhausen  in  March,   1935.4    Von
Falkenhausen  proved  to  be  of  great  value  to  Chiang  Kai-shek
because  of  their  ability  to  converse  in  Japanese.    Chiqng
Kai-shek  had  spent  several  years  in  Japan  and  Von  Falkenhausen
had  served  as  a  military  attache  in  Japan  from  1910  to  1914.5
The  German  advisors  made  an  impact  on  the  Chinese  army.
Some  thirty  German-equipped  divisions  wel.e  brought  up  to  stand-
ards  un]mown  in  the  past  and  with  high  loyalty  to  the  Nal;ionalist
goverrment.6    These  German  advisors  and  their  trained  troops
proved  valuable  to  Chiangl s  "bandit-suppression  canpaignsn7
and  later  fighting  the  Japanese  in  the  Shanghai  area  in  1937.8
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After  the  Sino-Japanese  conflict  began,  Japan  became
upset  with  Germany  over  the  presence  of  the  military  mission
serving  China.     These  two  nations  were  allies  of  sorts  under
the  Anti-Comintel.n  Pact  of  1936  and  Japan  was  putting  pressure
on  the  Nazi  government  for  removal  of  the  mission.     On  August
26,   1937,   the  American  charge  d'affaires  in  Germany,   Gilbert,
wired  Secretary  Hull  concerning  Germany' s  position  and  Japanese
pressures.     Gilbert  stated  that  the  German  Foreign  Office
wanted  to. retain  the  mission  and  believed  that  Japan  was  making
propaganda  out  of  Russian  aid  to  China.9     The  Germans  were
divided  themselves  over  what  policy  they  should  follow.     Sino-
German  relations  were  good,   the  market  in  China  for  German
exports  was  improving,   and  also  it  was  the  feeling  of  thany
that  if  the  German  advisors  were  withdrawn,   China  would  be
forced  to  go  to  Russia  for  assistance.     This  would  certainly
work  against  the  Anti-Comintern  spirit.]°    On  October  20,   1937,
Gilbert  reported  tha.t  the  Germans  believed  their  removal
would  ''drive  China  into  Soviet  arms."LL    As  a  rule  the  German
general  staff  was  pro-Chinese,  but  after  Ribbentrop  became
for.eign  minister,   they  were  overruled  and  a  shift  toward  the
Japanese  position  wa,s  made.L2     In  February,   1938,   Hitler  gave
a  signal  as  to  the  way  his  policy  was  to  shift  when  he  recog-
nized  the  Japanese  puppet  state  of  ''Manchukuo."     This  was
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followed  up  with  a  treaty  in  May,   and  later  that  month  on
May  25,   the  German  Ambassador  to  China,   Oscar  P.   Trautmann,
asked  the  Chinese  government  that  military  advisors  be  allowed
''to  cancel  their  contracts  and  return  to  Gel.many."    Also  he
announced  that  German  shipments  of  war  material  were  being
halted.13
0n  June   2,   1938,   American  Ambassador  Wilson  in  Germany,
informed  Secretary  Hull  that  Germany  was  recalling  her  miss,ion
as  ''it  was   lout  of  line  with  Germany's  neutral  position'   for
them  to   continue  their  service.WL4    Ambassa,dor  Johnson  informed
Secretary  Hull  that  the  German  government  was  threatening  loss
of  citizenship,   personal  proper.ty,   and  possible  punishment
for  treason  for  any  of  the  advisors  that  failed  to  cancel  their
contracts  and  return  to  Germany.L5
Chiang  Kai-shek  objected  to  the  German  mission  being
withdrawn  but  was  powerless  to  stop  it.     He  did  tell  von
Falkenhausen  that  the  Germans  possessed  many  Chinese  secrets
that  could  be  utilized  by  the  Japanese.     G.eneral  Von  Falkenhausen
took  precautions  that  none  of  the  mission  would  leave  Asia  via
Japan  and  compromise  Chinals  military  secrets.16    Ambassador
Johnson  reported  that  the  Chinese  gave  two  banquets  for  the
Germans  before  they  left  to  show    their  gratitude  for  their
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assistance  over  the  years.     One  was  given  by  Chiang  on  July  2,
1938,   and  the  other  by  the  Minister  of  War  on  July  4,   1938.17
Even  after  the  removal  of  the  German  mission,   Germany's
policy  toward  China  was  very  ambiguous.     In  October,   1938,
she  signed  a  barter  agreement  with  China  which  had  liberal
tel`ms,   but  the  losses  of  Canton  and  Hankow  caused  the  agl.eement
to  become  of  little  value  to  the  Chinese.     Germany  was  hesitant
to  write  off  the  Chinese  market  i;hat  was  beginning  to  develop
and  felt  that  a  complete  Japanese  victory  would  probably  close
the  trade  with  Europe.L8    Even  as  la.te  as  I)ecember  13,   1938,
the  American  Consul  at  Rangoon,   Brady,   reported  that  the  first
shipment  on  the  newly  opened  Burma  Road  was  made  up  of  German
and  Czech  arms  and  munitions.L9                                                       i,
The  German  fears  that  the  removal  of  their  military
mission  would  open  the  door  to   the  Soviets  were  well  founded.
The  truth  was  that  long  before  the  German  withdrawal,  Russian
assistance  was  being  received  by  China.     The  Sino-Soviet  relations
had  taken  a  turn  toward  improvement  with  the  Siam  incident
and  its  forthcoming  ''united  front."    Before  the  Sino-Japanese
conflict  flared  up,   the  Soviet  Ambassador  to  China,   Dimitri
Bogomoloff ,   in  April  1937,   proposed  a  mutual  assistance  treaty
between  the   Soviet  Union  and  China.     Bog.omoloff  also  proposed
a  Soviet  loan  of  approximately  $125,COO,000  for  munitions  and
L7EEng,  RE,   Ill.  2i3.
|8young, China a,nd  the  Helping  E3E±o   P.   60.=======   :i:-::
L9EEEg,  no,  Ill.  6i2.
36
arsenal  machinery  for  the  Chinese.20    China  refused  the  Soviet
proposals  at  the  time  and  later,  after  the  outbreak  of  hostil-
ities,  was  able  to  get  only  a  Sino-Soviet  non-aggression  pact.
Even  so,  with  the  outbreal{  of  the  war,  Russia  was  the  first
nation  to  offer  and  give  concrete  assistance  to  China.
The  assistance  began  almost  immediately  and  at  the  time
of  the  signing  of  the  non-aggression  pact  on  August  21,  1937,
a  promise  of  credit  of  $30,000,000  was  given.     This  credit
was  raised  to  $50,000,000  when  formally  signed  in  1938.    Mean-
while,  the  Soviet  Union  began  to  assist  China  with  all  efforts
llshort  of  war.W2L    Russia  realized  that  her  best  and  cheapest
defense  againsi;  Japan  would  be  the  Chinese,  and  therefore,   the
Soviet  investments  in  strengthening  China's  power  to  rpsist
the  Japanese  `.ras  in  the  best  iinterest  of  its  o`+in  defense.22    The
Sino-Soviet  pact  of  non-aggression  and  the  Soviet  assistance  was
indeed  "good  news"  to  the  embattled  Chinese,  but  it  did  prove
the  inevitable  resuscitation  of  the  communist  movement  in  China
which  afforded  a  ''good  propaganda  weapon''  for  Japan  to  use  in
showing  Germany  and  others  of  her  battle  against  communism  in
Asia.23
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The  news  and  activities  of  the  Soviets  in  their  assistance
to  China  were  quickly  learned  by  American  diplomats  around  the
world,  who  did  not  fail  to  report  to  the  State  Department.     The
charge  d'affairs  in  the  Soviet  Union,  Henderson,  reported  on
August  26,   1937,   that  he  believed  the  Kremlin  had  instruct;ed  the
Chinese  Communist  Party  to  support  Chiang,  but  to  infiltrate
and  await  the  right  opportunity.    Also,  he  believed  that  aid
from  Russia  to  be  limited  to  aircraft  due  to  poor  transportation
routes.24    Henderson  seems  to  be  una.ware  that  the  cormunists
were  cooperating  wii;h  Chiang's  government  since  the   ''united
front"  agreement  rea.ched  at  Sian.     Henderson  followed  his  mes-
sage  with  another  on  September  20,   1937,   informing  Secretary  Hull
of  the  Sino-Soviet  Non-Aggression  Treaty  signed  on  August  21,
|937.25     The  charge  dlaffa.irs  in  France,   1'rilson,   informed  the
I)epartment  on  September  29,   1937,   of  the  news  of  Soviet  ship-
ments,  which  he  believed  to  be  small  because  of  the  poor  trans-
portation  system,  and  also  tha,i  Italy  and  Germany  were  selling
impo|.tart   items  to   China.26     Ambassador  Gre``/,r,   in  Tokyo,   wired
on  October  i,   1937,   that  the  Japanese  were   ''somewhat  upset  but
quiet  on  the  surface,"  and  he  did  not  believe  the  aid  would
anount  to  IT^uch  more  than  military  advisors  and  moral  support.27
Wilson,   in  Paris,   informed  Secretary  I-lull  on  October  16,   1937,
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that  some  four  hundred  airplanes,  both  bombers  and  pursuits,
had  been  shipped  to  China  along  with  instructors  and  that
appl.oximately  two  hundred  trucks  were  operating  regulal'1y  in
car.avans  transpol.ting  military  supplies  to  China  via  central
Asia.28
The  Russian  mission  to  China  consisted  of  some  of  their
best  military  minds.     In  1937,   I`v[arshal  Klimenti  Voroshilov
was  placed  in  charge  of  the  Russian  mission.     His  deputy  M.
Smirnov,   became  the  Soviet  Ambassador  to  China.  in  late  1937,
replacing  Bog.omolov.     Other  famous  Soviets  serving  in  China
were  Generals  Georgi  Zhukov  as  milita,ry  attache  and  Vassily
Chuikov  as  an  advisor.29
Russian  credits  to  China  in  the  years  fl.om  1937  to  1941
totaled   some   S$250,000,OOO.      The   chief  negotia,tor   of  China
for  the  non-aggression  pact  and  the  credits  was  the  Chinese
Ambassador  to  ]\.Ioscow,   Sun  Fo,   son   of  Dr.   Sun  ¥a,i-sen.3°     The
Chinese  negotiated  for  credits  of  $50,000,000  effective  in
March,   1938,   another  ¢b50,OOO,000  in  July  of  tha.t  year,   and  for
$150,000,COO  in  June,   1939,   a,ll   of  which  were  handled  by  Sun
Fo.     The  Chinese  were  to  repay  these  credits  in  shipments  of
tea,  wool,   tungsten,  lead,   and  other  strategic  materials.3]
Apparently  the  Soviet  credits  ha.d  no  political  stl.ings. attached
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nor  did  any  credits  go  to  the  Chinese  Communl8t  Party,  but
directly  to  the  Nationalist  Govermment. 32
Once  negotiations  for  credits  were  settled  and  credits
granted  the  movement  of  military  supplies  to  China  and  ship-
ment  out  of  agricultural  and  mineral  products  I or  payment
presented  a  real  challenge.    Many  of  the  goods  came  and  went
via. the  old  1,700  mile  silH  route  from Lanchow  through  Sinkiang
to  the  Russian  border.33    The  United  States  Anlbassador  to
France,  Bullitt,  reported  to  Secretary  Hull  on  January  13,
1958,  that  he  had  received  a visit  from  in.  Ting-fu  Tsiang,
the  recent  Chinese  Ainbassador  to  Moscow.    in.  Ping-fu  Tsiang
said  that  aid  was  moving  overland  from Alma Ata  in  Russian
!urkestan  to  Urumchi  in  Sinkiang,  and  then  to  Iianshow,  !Paoching,
and  Ohungking  on  aL  completely  motor  road.       The  trip  under
the  best  of  conditions  took  some  eighteen  days  from  the  Soviet
border  to  Ohungking.    Fuel  for  the  trucks  was  a  great  problem
with much  of  the  gasoline  for  the  trucks.    return  trips  being
carried  to  China by  camel  caravans.    In  addition  to  the  over
land  assistance,  almost  all  of  the  bulk  and  heavier  equipment
was  transported  by  sea  to  Hong  Kong,  to  Canton  and  into  the
interior,  or  via  the  French  Railway  from  Indochina.34    0n  May  9,
1938,  Aribassador  Bullitt  again  contacted  the  State    I)epartment
concerning  transportation  to  China.    In  this  message  Bullitt
tells  of  a visit  by  Sun  Fo  and  the  news  that  China  had  an
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army  of  snow  shovelers  keeping  the  road  through  Sinkiang  open
in  winter,   and  that  at  the  time   some  175,000  coolies  were
working  on  the  new  road  to  Burma.35    A  better  road  was  completed
in  1940  leading  from  Ulan  Ude  on  the  Trans-Siberian  Railroad
via  Ulan  Bator,   in  Outer  Mongolia,   then  to  Ningsia  and  on  to
Lanchow.36    Ambassador  Johnson,   in  Chungking,   reported  on  the
effectiveness  of  the  overland  road  on  April  30,   1941.     He
stated  that  less  than  2,000  tons  per  month  were  reaching  Lan-
chow,   and  that  therewere   some  8,000  to  10,000  camels  used  in
the  gasoline  caravan  transpol.i.     A  camel  load  was  106  gallons,
and  the  trip  took  three  months.37
0f  primary  importance  to  China  vi.a.s  the  aviation  assistance
provided  by  the  Soviet  Union.     Early  in  1938,   some  400,  to
500  Russian  planes  had  been  delivered  to  the  Chinese.     The
Soviets  also  sent  instructors  and  flying  schools  were  estab-
lished  at  Urumchi  in  Sinkiang  and  at  Chengtu  in  Szechwan.     A
major  Soviet  air  base  was  established  nea,r  I,anchow  in  Kansu.38
Almost  all  of  the  Russian  aircra,ft  a.nd  instructors  sent  i;o
China  were  more  than  a,ssistance  to  China.     In  fact  they  were
complete  squadrons  of  the  Red  Air  Force  wearing  civilian  cloth-
ing.39     The  pilot  Royal  I,eo:ia.rd,   `./orking  for  Chiang  Kai-shek
at  the  time  reported  that  approximately  700  pursuits  and  light
bombers  were  used  by  the  Russians  in  China,   with  the  number
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of  pilots  and  ground  crew  being  near  2,000  men.4°    A  retired
American Any  pilot  working  for  China,  Claire  I.  Ohennault,  the
Russians  and  Chinese  aviators  worked  up  a  trap  for  the  Japanese
air force  near  Hankow  on  April  29,  1938.     This  proved  to  be
the  "largest  aerial  battle  in history  prior  to  World  War  11"
and was  a big  victory  for  China,  but  as  the  war  continued  the
Chinese  air  force  was  devastated  by  continued  combat  and  scant
reinforcements.4L
Russian  assistance  was  not  limited  to  aviation  alone.
Schools  were  established,  and  Soviet  instructors  gave  training
on  Russian  weapons,  equipment,  and  even  tactics.    Also  Russian
officers  were  assigned  *o  almost  all  of  the  Chinese  armies  to
give  strategic  and  tedhical  assistance.42    Enough  Russ fran
equipment  was  delivered  to  China  from  1938  until  1940  to  equip
ten  Chinese  divisions.43    United  States  Ambassador  to  the  Soviet
Union,  Steinhardt,  reported  on  the  value  of  Soviet  assistance
in  the  following  message  to  Secretary  Hull  on  September  22,
1939:
Soviet  assistance  to  China  in  equipment,  material,
nurses,  supplies  since  the  beginning  of  the  Japanese-
Chinese  conflict  has  in  quantity  been more  than
that  obtained  from  all  other  countries  together  and
has  been  largely  financed  by  long-term  credits  at  low
rates  extended  by  the  Soviet  Union  to  China.    Iiast
June  a  credit  of  nearly  200,000,000  dollars  was  granted
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which  broughithe  total  of  Soviet  cl.edits  since  the
beginning  of  the  conflict  to  500,000,000  dollars.
Approximately  i,000  aircraft  consisting  of  SB  bombers
and  pursuit  planes  have  been  delivered  by  the  Soviet
Union  to  China  i;ogether  with  large  quantities  of  al.ms
especially  light  field  pieces  a.nd  machine  guns.     Approx-
mately  2,000  Soviet  pilots  in  rotai;ion  have  been  given
combat  pl'actice  with  the  Chinese  air  force.44
Needless  to  say  Japan  was  gI`eatly  upset  with  the  Soviet
assistaLnce  to  China.     Maxim  Litvinov,   the  Soviet  representative
to  the  League  of  Nations,   urged  assistance  for  China  when  the
matter  was  taken  up  in  1937.     When  the  problem  wai3  passed  to
members  of  the  Nine-Power  Treaty,   the  Soviets  accepted  an
invitation  to  Brussels  and  proved  to  be  the  strongest  sup-
porter  of  China  and  urged  sanctions  against  the  Japanese.
Using  Russo-Japanese  trade  figures  as  a  guide  one  can  see
'
the  effect  of  Moscow's  hard  line  policy  against  Japan'`s  aggres-
sion  in  China.     In  1937  the  ira.de  totaled  3,902,000  yen  and
by  the   end  of  1938  had  been  reduced  to   only   380,ooo  yen.45
Tokyo  strongly  protested  the  assistance  given  China,  which
she  considered  went  way  beyond  the  Sino-Soviet  Non-Aggression
Treaty.46    0n  April  4,   1938,   the  Japanese  protested  the  use
of  Russian  planes  and  pilots  in  China.     Iiitvinov  rejected  the
Tokyo  protest  and  pointed  out  that  Japan's  friends,   the  Germans,
were  still  in  China.47    1'Jith  the  signing  of  the  Russo-German
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non-a,ggression  pact  of  August  23,   1939,   assistance  to  China  did
not  cease,   and  Japan  continued  to  pl.otest  to  the  Soviet  Union.48
0n  April  13,  1941,  Japan  and  Russia  signed  a  five-year
neutrality  treaty.    In  the  treaty  both  nations  gave  agreements
to  I.espect  territory  held  by  the  other  and  both  were  given  at
the  expense  of  China.     Russia  agreed  to  I`espect  Japam's  rights
in  ''Manchukuo''  and  the  Japanese  a,greed  i;o  respect  Russian  rights
in  the   "Mongolian  Peoplels  Republic,''  both  of  which  were  claimed
by  Nationalist  China  as  Chinese  territory,     Chiang  Kai-shek
believed  that  the  treaty  would  mark  the  end  of  Russian  assistance.49
Ambassador  Steinhart  wil.ed  Secretal.y  IIull  on  March  24,   1941,
that  he  had  been  visited  by  the  Japanese  Minister  for  Foreign
Affairs,   ]vlatsuoka,   who  was  on  a  special  visit  to  ri.Ioscow.
Matsuoka  told  Steinhardt  that  the  United  States  was  keeping
the  Chinese  government  fighting,  and  the  United  States  had
the  power  to  end  the  Sino-Japanese  wa,r.50    Russian  aid  to  China
had  slowed  with  the  start  of  fighting  in  Europe  in  September,
1939.     It  slowed  even  more  with  the  non-aggression  treaty
with  Japan,   and  with  Hitler's  attack  in  the  summer  of  1941,   it
ceased.51    Amba,ssador  Steinhardt  reported  a  conversation  with
Chinese  Ambassador  to  Russia,   Shao  Iji-tzu,   to  Secretary  Hull
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him  that  war  materials  already  in  route  would  be  delivered,  but
that  ''he  had  gained  the  impl`ession  that  no  further  deliveries
would  be  made."52     Molotov,   the  For.eign  Commissar  of  the   Soviet
Union,   announced  in  a  conference  at  the  Kremlin  with  Ambassador
Steinhardt  and  Harry  I"  Hopkins  on  July  31,  1941,   that  supplies
to  China  had  been  stopped  due  to  Russials  own  needs  in  her  de-
fense  against  Germany.53    One  indirect  way  in  which  the  Soviet
Union  had  been  helping  China,   and  continued  to  do  so  even  after
assistance  si;opped  was  by  keeping  strong  military  forces  in
Siberia  along  the  Manchurian  border.    Japan  did  not  trust  the
Soviets  and  was  forced  to  station  forces  of  her  own  along  the
frontier.     In  the  years  1937  to  1940,  Japan  retained  some
200,000  to  400,000  troops   in  Manchuria,   and  between  194-1  to
1945,   some  460,000  to  784,000  troops  i.7ere  tied  dovm  in  Manchuria.54
In  the  years  from  1937  until  mid-194l,   the  Soviet  Union
was  the  only  nation  that  gave  substantial  assistance  to  China.
Some  $250,000,000  was  pledg`ed  by  the  Russians  for  milital.y
assistance  to  the  Chinese  and  about  one-half  of  the  amount
had  been  used  when  assistance  was  halted  because  of  the
German  attaclc  on  the   Soviet  union.55
The  policies  of  the  8.overnment  of  France  were  very  vital
and  important  to  tl-Le  Chinese  during  the  early  years  of  her
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struggle  with  Japan.     Among  the  various  ways  France  and  French
diplomacy  affected  the  Chinese were in  the  sales  of  munitions,
aircraft,  etc.,  from  private  industry,  possible  French  credits,
and  access  to  the  outside  world  via  the  French  Indochina  Rail-
wa,y.     During  the  war  years  credits  were  granted  by  France  on
three  occasions.     The  first  credit  was  for  400,000,000  francs,
announced  in  September,   1937,   for  currency  protection  between
the  French  and  Chinese  currencies.     The  other  two  French  credits
were  for  construction  of  railroad  lines  extending  into  China
using  the  French  Indochina  Railway  as  a  trunk  line.    The  first
of  these  was  for  150,000,000  francs  in  August,   1938,   for  the
construction  of  the  Annan-Chennankwam  Railway  between  French
Indochina  and  Kwangsi.     The   second  loam  was  for  480,000,000
francs,   announced  in  I)ecember,   1939,   for  the  construction
of  the  Hsufu-Kurming  Railway  between  Szechwan  and  ¥unnan.56
Both  of  these  I'ailroad  construction  loarLs  proved  to  be  of
little  or  no  value  to  the  Chinese.     Ijong  before  the  construction
was  completed  on  the  first  railroad,  Annan-Chennankwan  or
Narming  railway,   the  a.rea  fell  under  Japanese  occupation.57
The  second  railway  construction  credit,   Hsufu-Kunming,  was
dropped  when  Hitler  overran  Europe  a  short  time  after  the
Credit  had  been  granted.58
The  Chinese  had  beti;er  luck  in  the  purchase  of  military
supplies  from  French  private  industry  before  the  wa.r  in  Europe
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started  in  September,   1939.     Ambassador  Bullitt,   in  Paris,
informed  the  State  Department  on  August  26,   1937,   that  China
was  a.ble  to  obtain  airplanes  in  France  even  though  almost  all
munitions  and  airplanes  had  been  nai;ionalized.     In  answer  to
Japanese  protest,  Bullitt  pointed  out  tha,t  the  French  reported
they  had  no  control  over  private  industry.59    0n  November  5,
1937,   Ambassador  Johnson  wired  from  Nanking  that  Chinese
purchases  abroad  were  being  received.     Iie  had  lea,rned  of  the
following  military  aircraft  purchases-forty-four  from France,
fifty  from  Great  Britain,  and  three  hundred  from  Russia.6°
Ambassador  Grew  reported  from  Tokyo   on  July  11,   1938,   that
Japan  was  bitter  at  French  policies.     The  Japanese  pl.otested
that  France  had  permii;ted  increased  shipments  of  arms  .and
munitions  via  Indochina.     Ja,pan  thought  i;hat  France  was  selling
military  supplies  to  China  that  had  -Loreviously  gone  to  the
Spanish  Government.     Also  Japan  wondered  if  French  advisors
would  replace  the  depart;ing  Germans.6L
France  was  most  important  to  China  because  of  the  French
Indochina  Railway.     This  government  owned  railroad  ran  from
the  port  of  Haiphong,  via  Hanoi,   to  Ijao'kal  at  the  Chinese  border.
From  Ijaokai  to  Kunming  there  was  a  il.La -... row  meter-gage  railway
through  very  rugged  country,   with  many  bridges,   and  extremely
steep  grades.62    -iiJithin  a  short  time  after  the  fighting  started,
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Canton  and  the  French  Indochina  Railway  were  the  only  important
entries  into  China,  and  after  the  fall  of  Canton  to  the  Jap-
anese  in  October,  1938,   the  importance  of  the  French  Indochina
Railway  was  beyond  description.
The  railway  was  never  completely  open  to  Chinese  shipments
as  Japanese  pressure  forced  numerous  regulations  to  be  imposed
by  the  French  authorities.    Early  in  1937,  Japaniireatened  to
bomb  the  line  if  war  materials  continued  to  move  into  China.
Due  to  the  disturbed  situation  in  Eul.ope,  France  bo`.red  to  Jap-
anese  pressure  and  regulations  forbidding  certain  items  to  be
transported  were  issued.    However,  French  officials  in  Indo-
china  took  a very  liberal  view  of  these  regulations  and  con-
tinued  to  let  items  disguised  or  mixed  with  non-military  items
pass.    Also,  to  be  as  lenient  as  possible,  anything  that  could
possibly  be  used  in  a  non-military  manner,  such  as  trucks,
aircraft,  aircraft  parts,  gasoline,  etc.,  was  allowed  to  pass.63
Japanese  pressure  continued  on  the  French  authorities  to
further  limit  the  flow  of  supplies  into  China.    In  November,
1938,   the  French  were  able  to  ease  the  pressure  somewhat  by
delaying  shipments  of  iron  ore,   copper,  and  coal  from  Indochina  .
to  Japan.64    Early  in  1939,  Japan  applied  even  more  pressure
as  she  seized  Hainan  Island  just  off  the  Indochina  coast.    Since
early  in  1938  there  had  been  an  understanding  that  if  France  would
check  and  limit  munitions  shipped  via  the  railway,  Japan  would
not  seize  Hainan.    After  this  Japanese  move  the  French  became
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even  more  liberal  in  their  inspections.65    With  the  fall  of  France
in  June,  1940,  Japan  took  a  long  look  at  Southeast  Asia.     In
Eul.ope,  France  and  the  Netherlands  were  under  German  occupation,
and  Great  Britain  was  facing  Germany  and  Italy;  therefore,  South-
east  Asia  looked  more  inviting  to  Japan  than  did  the  Chinese  in-
terior.66    Also  with  such  a  move  into  Southeast  Asia  the  supply  of
goods  going  to  China  could  be  cut  even  more.    France  under  great
pressure  from  both  Germany  and  Japan  finally  brok;  over.  Governor
General  Catrourc  of  Indochina  suspended  the  movement  of  all  munitions
and  war  materiel  to  China  and  admitted  JaLpamese  observers  into  Indo-
china.67    Japan,  not  satisfied  with  this  arrangement,  gave  France
an  ultimatum,  that  by  September  22,  1940,  let  her  garrison  and  have
the  use  of  three  air  bases  in  Indochina  and  station  trpops  at
the  port  of  Haiphong.    Although  the  French  authorities  yielded
to  these  demands,  the  Japanese  Canton  Any  invaded  Indochina  at
I)ongland  and  Langson,   and  bombed  Haiphong  in  September,   1940.
''A  few  days  laLter  Japan  joined  the  German-Italian  Axis.W68
Great  Britain,  for  almost  the  sane  reasons  as  France,  was
important  to  China  in  her  war  against  Japanese  a,ggression.
Great  Britain  was  important  for  the  sale  of  war  materials,
credits  or  loans  from  the  British  goverrment,  and  her  control   '
of  vital  strategic  locations  of  entry  into  China.    Also,  Great
Britain  had  a  long  history  of  involvement  in  ChinaL  and  was
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the  largesi;  foreign  investor  in  that  country.     It  is  estimated
that  in  1931  the  British  hadfl97,96l,800  invested  in  China.
Of  this  amount f l30,OOO,OOO  was   invested  in  Shangha.i,  J°35,OOO,
000  in  Hong  Kong,   andd930,OOO,OOO  in  the  rest   of  the   country.
This  investment  was  divided  as  follows:   25  percent  in  export/
import  trading,   14  percent  in  transport,   18  percent  in  mamufac-
turing,  12  percent  in  banking  and  finance,  12  percent  in  real
estate,   5  percent  in  public  utilities,   2  percent  in  mining,  and
3  percent  in  other  activities.     In  addition  to  this  there  were
df46,400,OOO  invested  in  Chinese  government  obliga.tions.     By
1937  the  direct  investment  in  China  had  grovm  toj€250,000,OO0
of  whichz9200,OOO,OO0  was   in  business   investments  andrf50,OOO,
000  in  Chinese  government  obligations.69                                ,
'p.Jith  the  stari;  of  the  Sino-Ja,panese  conflict,  Britain
looked  toward  the  United  Sta,tes  and  France  for  a  joint  policy
to  use  in  confl'ontation  of  J-a,pan.     This  policy  was  not  forth-
coming  since  the  French  felt  that  they  were  doing  all  they
possibly  could  by  permittin6r  munitions shipments  on  the  French
Indochina  Railway,   while  the  United  States  was  in  the  midst  of
isolationism.70    The  British  Foreicrn  Office  brought  up  joint
Anglo-American  mediation  three  times  ir.  July,   1937,   but  it
was  rejected.   `.I.   ignored  by  Washington.7L     Because   of  the
American  and  =i`rench  policies,   Grea,i  Britain  refused  to   take
Rctrea.i;   from  China
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a  hard  line  against  Japan  at  the  League  or  at  Brussels.    When
Wellington  Koo  proposed  to  ask  if  Japan's  actions  had  not  been
a  violaLtion  at  the  I.eague,   Great  Britain  advised  that  he  change
his  plea  because  if  Japan  declared  war  it  might  force  the  Amer-
ican  Neutrality  Iiaw  ini;o  effect.72
The  Sino-Japanese  conflict  also  caught  Great  Britain  at
a  bad  time  as  far  as  munitions  sale  to  China  was  concerned.
In  1937,   Britain  was  in  her  own  rearmament  program,   and  there
was  the  general  feeling  that  arm  sales  would  make  matters
worse  by  angerin8.  Japan.     It  was  believed  i;hat  arms  could  not
be  produced  and  transported  to  China,  in  sufficient  quantities
to  help.73    However,   the  British  by  way  of  their  carrying  trade
and  American  munitions  sales  to  Great  Britain  did  aid 'China.
Munitions  in  American  were  sold  to  BI.itish  buyers,   shipped
across  the  Atlantic,   i;hen  moved  by  British  bottoms  to  Hong
Kong.     In  the  months  of  October  through  I)ecember,   1937,   the
State  Department  granted  licenses  for  over  $2,500,000  in
munitions  that  reached  China  via.  this  route.74
Two  methods  of  British  assistance  were  in  credits  for
currency  support  and  in  credits  for  direct  purchases  in  the
sterling  bloc.     Great  Britain  did  more  than  any  other  nation
in  suppol.i  of  Chinals  currency  in  the  early  war  years.
Perhaps  because  of  the  British  subjects  serving  in  financial
positions  in  the  Chinese  custom  services  and  financial
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institutions,  Great  Britain  was  able  to  better  understand  the
need  for  currency  proi;ection.     Perhaps,   too,   because  of  her
position  in  Chinese  trade  and  commerce,   a  sound  Chinese  currency
was  vital  to  her  position.    The  first  British  credit  for
currency  stabilization  was £5,000,000  a.nnounced  in  March,
1939.75     This  was  followed  by  another  credit   of £5,OOO,OO0
in  April,   1941,   following.  a  United  States   credit   of  `dr)50,OOO,OOO
for  currency  stabiliza.tion.76    Also  concerned  with  currency
stabilization,   Greai;  BI`itain  and  the  United  States  gave  what
assistance  possible  in  China's  "currency  war''  with  Japan  in
north  China  from  1938-1940.77    Great  Britain  did  what  she  could
to  save  Chinese  customs  collected  in  Japanese  occupied  China
by  working  out  a  plan  with  the  Japanese  for  deposit  in I,the
YokohaJiia  Specie  Bank  and  application  to  foreigri  cormitments.78
China  had  requested  large  loans  from  Great  Britain,
France,   and  the  United  States  in  1937  after  the  failure  of
the  Ijeague  meeting  and  the  Brussels  Conference.     Great  Britain,
like  the  two  other  na,tions  g.ave  little  consideration  to  the
request.     China  again  made  request  for  a  credit  in  1938  for
purchases  and  for  the  construction  of  a  railway  from  Chengtu
to  the  Burma  border.     This  request  was  denied,   as  Britain
feared  that  serious  discussions  between  the  British  Ambassador
75.Jones   and  lvlyers,
76¥ounG.
I)ocur!ients.    I.   271.
China,  and  i;he IIelping  !Ee±£i   p.   440.
LR3trcat  from  China
78Eii£.,   pij.   57-62.
pp.   102-105.
52
and  the  Japanese  Foreign  Office  in  Tokyo  would  be  damaged.79
By  and  large  British  credits  usually  followed  loans  by  the
United  States.     After  an  American  credit  of  $25,000,000  in
Februal.y,   1938,  Britain  followed  with  credits  of £5,500,000
in  March,  1938,   and  after  the  United  States  $50,000,000  cl'edit
in  April,   1941,   Great  Britain  followed  with  a£5,000,OOO
credit.8°    After  this  April  credit,  Britain  was  unable  to
give  much  financial  assistance  and  her  attitude  changed  to
one  of  believing  that  China  could  not  make  the  necessary
reforms  nor  correct;  a  poor  financial  situation,  and  therefore,
American  and  British  cl.edits  would  have   llno  lasting  results.WBL
Altogether  Great  Britain  ext;ended  purchase  credits  of €8,359,
000  to  China  during  the  period  from  1937  through  |94|.,82
Hong  Kong,   like  French  Indochina,  was  of  greatest  im-
portance  to  China,.     By  September,   1937,   Japarl  had  announced
the  closing  of  all  Chinese  ports  except  Tsingtao.83    0n  November  4,
1937,  Ambassador  Bingham  in  Ijondon,  wired  Secretary  Hull  that
Hong  Kong  was  the  only  port  through  which  arms   could  be  shipped
to  China.     He  pointed  out  that  Tsingtao  was  open  but  at  Japan-
ese  mercy  and  t=Aii-I-   +Lhe   Portuguese   had   closed  Macao.84     0n  June  |5,
79Eiig.,  p.  82.
80young, China and   the   Helping  ±E±]±g,   P.   400.
g#lffi:=:1y?L1;J::g`i,?rfi;r
82¥oung. China  a,nd  the
British #o#i¥
I.Ielping  !I±p£,     p.   158.
Retreat  from  China
84EBH£,  RE,   Ill.   658.
IJ.    47.
53
1938,  seventy-five  percent  of  all  military  supplies  to  China
were  going  through  Hong  Kong.85    After  October,   1938,   and  the
fall  of  Canton,  Hong  Kong  ceased  to  be  as  important  but  con-
tinued  to  be  the  main  entry  by  air  to  China  until  Pea,r|  Harbor.86
The  other  British-controlled  entry  i;o  China  was  through  Burma.
The  Chinese  realized  the  vulnerability  of  both  Canton  and  the
French  Indochina  Railway  early  in  the  wa.r  and  began  to  look
for  another  route  for  development.    A  logical  site  was  the  old
`i
trade  route  between  Kunming  in  Yunnan  I'rovince  to  Lashio  in
northeastern  Bul.rna.     This  route  was  approximately  715  miles  in
length,  and  of  this  distance  about  115  miles  was  inside  British
Burma.     Before  the  war  star.ted,   approximately  265  miles  from
Kurming  to  Hsiakwan  had  been  constructed.     Construction  was
carried  on  by  conscripted  labor  from  Yunnan  Province  using
primitive  methods.     Thousands  of  men,   women,   and  children
worked  the  road  using  hand  tools  and  moving  earth  and  stone  by
baskets.87    From  I|ashio,  Burma,   there  vras  a  rail  line  to  the
Bul.rna  pori;  of  Rangoon.     The  railroad  was  constructed  over  rugged
terrain.     In  the  Gokleik  gorge,   bet\.7een  lvlandalay  and  Iiashio
the  railroa.d  clip.bed  3,000  feet  in  t\-,'enty-seven  miles.     The
grade  wa.s  so  si;eep  that  the  trains  had  to  be  divided  into
sections  and  hauled  by  special  hill-climbing  locomotives.P8
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The  Burma  road  was  opened  by  the  BI`itish  to  traffic  in  December,
|938,89  and  by  early  1939,   the  Chinese  Southwest  Transporta,tion
Company  was  operating  GOO  trucks  on  the  road  not  counting
private  trucks  involved  in  non-mi|ita,ry  traffic.9°
Ja,pan  pressured  the  British  as  they  had  the  French  over
the  supply  of  goods  coming  into  China.     Japan  was  able  to  end
the  effectiveness  of  Hong  Kong,   except  as  ail  air  terminal,  by
the  occupation  of  Canton  in  October,   1938,   and  after  her  move
into  Indochina  only  the  entry  via  Burma  was  open  to  the  sea.
In  the  summer  of  1940,  with  Britain  facing  Germany  and  Italy
alone,   Ja.pan  forced  a  temporary  closing  of  the  Burma  road.     It
should  be  pointed  out  that  this  pressure  was  coupled  with  Dunkirk,
the  fall  of  France,  the  battle  of  Brita,in,  and  was  before
President  Roosevelt's  destroyer-base  deal  and  Lend-|jease.9L
The  feeling  in  Brii;aim  \./as  tha,i  another  challenge  could  not  be
confronted  at  the  time.92     Iherefore,   on  July  18,   1940,   Prime
rv'Iinister  Churchill  announced  to  the  I-louse   of  Commons,   that  Great
Britain  ha.d  a,greed  to  the   suspension  of  shipments  of  arms,
arrmunition,  petrol,.  lorries,   and  railway  materia,i  along  the
Burma  Road  for  three  months.     Churchill  poini;ed  out  that  it
was  his  desire  to  help  China,  but  they  were  involved  in  a  war
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in  Europe,   and  he  hoped  the  three  months  would  be  used  to  find
a  peaceful  set-t|ement.93
Secretary  IIull said  in  his  Memoirs  that  the  road  was
closed  due  to  Japanese  pressure  for  three  months,   and  during
that  time  efforts  were  devoted  to  reaching  a  settlement  of  the
war.94    Prime  Minister  Churchill  told  the  House  of  Commons  on
October  8,   1940,   that  the  closing  of  the  road  had  not  helped
in  the  search  for  a  peaceful  solution  because  Japan  continued
her  aggression  in  China.     He  announced  that  the  road  would  be
reopened  on  October  17,   1940.95     The  British  leader  pointed
out  i;hal;  the  three  months  occurred  during  the  rainy  season
when  the  road  would  have    been  used  the  least  and  that  Japan
had  wanted  the  threermonth  limit  to  be  secret  but  Great  Britain
had  refused.96    The  United  States  protested  the  British  decision
to  close  the  road.     In  a  Sta.te  Department  press  release  of
July  16,   1940,   the  road  closing  was  said  to   ''constitute  un-
wal.ranted  interpositions  of  obstacles  to  wo|.|d  trade.W97
Secretary  Hull  protested  and  said  that  the  United  States  ha,d
a  "legitimate  interest  in  the  keeping  open  of  arteries  of
commerce   in  every  pa.rt   of  the  world.098
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lArhen  the  three  months  had  expired  on  October  17,   1940,
the  Burma  Road  was  I.eopened  for  shipments  to  China.     Perhaps
because  Britain  had  won  the  ''Battle  for  Britain''  and  the  danger
of  a  German  invasion  had  passed,   she  felt  that  renewed  Japanese
pressure  could  be  better  handled.     Secretary  Hull  points  out
that :
CBritain]    .„    had  seen  that  Japan  was  not  using  the
period  of  three  months  during  which  the  Burma  Road
was  closed  to  negotiai;e  peace  with  China,   but  on  the
contrary  was  aiming  more  directly  at  the  heart  of
China  by  sending  troops  through  French  Indo-China.
g:5E:igl:  h=g  ::nng:::3  a::i;:Semg:g  a:ianaE!:3:?g
As  has  been  pointed  out,   the  large  countries  of  Europe
played  a  very  defir-ii;e  role  in  the  Sino-Japanese  conflict.
Germany  was  the  major  provider  of  milii;ary  missions  and
supplies  until  world  politics  and  her  I-apanese  ally's  pleas
caused  a  change  in  her  foreign  policy.     Russia  came  immediately
to  the  aid  of  China..     Perhaps  her  move  was  spurred  on  because
of  her  fear  of  Ja,panese  aggression  into  Siberia,  however,  for
whatever  I.easons,  Russian  a,ssista.nee  proved  to  be  the  life
blood  of  China  for  some  three  years.     Britain  and  France  were
important  because  of  their  control  of  access  to  and  from  China.
Both  countries  gave  credits  and  sold  military  supplies  to  the
Chinese.     Other  nations  of  Europe  contributed  to  Chinals  de-
fensive  efforts.     In  1937  a£10,000,OO0  credit  was  extended  by
Czechosloval{ia  for  general  purchases  and  in  }JTarch,   1939,   a
&0,000,000  purchase  credit  was  extended  by  Belgium.loo     |t  is
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interesting  to  note.that  surveys  ranking  the  suppliers  of
munitions  to  China  made  by  the  United  States  goverrment  showed
the  following.     The  major  suppliers  ranked  in  order  as  of  March  12,
1938  -Gel.many,   Russia,   Italy,   France,   Belgium,   Denmark,   Czech-
oslovakia,   the  United  States,   and  Sweden;L°L  as  of  April  20,
1938  -Germany  or  Russia,   Italy  or  France,   Belgium,   Great  Britain,
Czechoslovakia,   the  United  States,   Sweden,   and  Dermark;L°2  and
as  of  June  15,1938  -Germany,  Russia.,   Italy,  England,   France,
i;he  United  States,   Belgium,   Sweden,  Austria,   Switzerland,   and
I)enmark.L03
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Chaper  IV
THE   UNITED   STATHS   AND   CHINA:
BRUSSElis   10   IjEFTD-IjEASE
Although  the  United  States  failed  to  provide  leadership
at  the  Iieague  of  Nations  meeting  and  at  the  Nine-Powers'
Conference  in  Brussels  i.,/hich  follo\`/ed,   a.nd  turned  a  deaf
ear  to  China's  pleas  for  credits,   some  assistance  wa,s  forth-
coming  to  the  Chinese  via.  the  established  American  silver
purchase  policy.
The  American  silver  purchase  policy  had  its  beginning
in  an  act   of  Congress  dated  June  19,   1934.     The  hopes   of
the  frarr:ers  of  this  leg`islai;ion  \./as  to  raise  the  price  of
silver,   therefore  rc-opening  many  western  silver  mines  which
would  aid  in  overcoming  the  great  economic  depression  of  the
tip,es.    With  this  domestic  situation  in  mind,   this  bill  was
enacted  but  little  regard  was  given  to  its  possible  foreign
effect.     Almost  imf,1.ediai;ely  this  legislation  affected  the
(58)
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Chinese  economy.     China  was  on  a  silver  standard  and  this  in-
cl.eased  price  paid  for  silver  by  the  United  States  government,
and  to  a  lesser  degree  by  the  gradual  I.ecovery  of  global  econ-
omy,   caused  large  amounts  of  the  precious  metal  to  find  its
way  to  the  United  Sta,tes.     The  Chinese  government  attempted
to  end  this  flow  of  silver  by  formal  protest  to  the  American
government  and  then  by  placing  an  export  ta,x  on  silver.     These
methods  failed  and  the  flow  continued  with  much  of  i;he  silver
being  smuggled  out  of  China  and  depression  set  in.     A  more
tangible  result  of  this  incident  was  China  being  forced  off
the  silver  standard  and  on  a  managed  paper  currency  economy
in  late  1935,  at  which  time  silver  wa.s  nationalized.i
In  May  of  1936,   the  Chinese  government  reached  accords
with  the  United  States  Department  of  Treasury  so  that  Chinese
silver  would  be  used  to  purchase  American  gold  to  help  solve
Chinals  economic  difficulties.2    Prior  to  July,1937,   the
United  States  lreasury  had  purchased  some  $67,000,000  worth
of  silver  from  China  and  a  further  credit  of  $20,000,000  had
been  authorized  on  some  60,000,000  ounces  of  silver  being
held  in  the  United  States.     Even  with  these  great  American
purchases  of  Chinese  silver,   silver  remained  as  forty-four
percent  of  China's  monetary  I.eserve   in  June,1937.3    Even
on  the  eve  of  the  Sino-Japanese  war,   the  Chinese  Minister  of
Finance,  H.   H.   Kung,   was  in  Washington  arranging  the  sale  of
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more  Chinese  silver.4    0n  July  8,   1937,   Secretary  Morgenthau
and  Minister  Kung  reached  agreement  that  some  62,000,000  ounces
of  silver  would  be  purchased  by  the  United  States  government
at  S.45  per  ounce.     This  agreement  was  reached  before  news  of
the  I.ecent  Marco  Polo  Bridge  incident  was  knoun.     Also,   on
July  8,   1937,   an  agreement  was  reached  by  the  Federal  Reserve
Board  of  New  York  to  grant  a  credit  of  up  to  $50,000,000  to
be  available  December  31,   1937,   against  gold  deposited  by
china.5
This  program  of  silver  purchases  proved  itself  to  be  of
great  importance  in  providing  needed  credits  to  the  Chinese
government  as  the  Sino-Japanese  conflict  settled  into  full
scale  warfare.     The  Iiondon  3{±=a_¥  of  August  30,   1937,   appraised
the  United  States  silver.  purchase  in  the  following  manner:
"Giving  China  a  good  price  for  her  silver  is  one  of  the  few
ways  in  which  the  \iJashington  Administration  can  favour  China
witriout  getting  into  trouble  with  (a)  Japan,   (b)  Congress,   and
(C)   the   Supreme   Court.n6
The  American  silver  purchase  program  did  not  end  as  the
warfare  continued  and  intensified  since  the  purchases  continued
whenever  China  had  silver  to  sell.     Secretary  Morgenthau  agreed
to  pul.chase  another  50,000,000  ounces  in  November,   1937,   at
the   S.45  per  ounce  rai;e,   and  on  I)ecember  2,   1937,   another
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50,000,000  ounces  at  S.45  per  ounce  was  purchased  on  the  basis
of  10,000,000  ounces  on  semi-monthly  installments  from  December  15,
1937,   to  February  15,   1938.     This  was  followed  in  February,
1938,   I)y  an  additional  50,000,000  ounces  to  be  purchased  in
five  semi-monthly  lots.    The  price  paid  for  the  silver  was
I.educed  on  this  purchase  from  the  usual  S.45  per.  ounce  to
S.43  per  ounce  due  to  a  controversy  with  Mexico,   one  of  the
world's  major  silver  producers.7
0n  April  12,   1938,   a  United  Press  dispatch  announced
that  the  United  States  Treasury  had  purchased  Chinese  silver
worth  over  $50,000,000  since  the  outbrealc  of  the  Sino-Japanese
war.8    At  the  end  of  April,   China  asked  the  Treasury  Department
to  pul'chase  an  additional  loo,000,000  ounces  of  silver.
Secretary  Morgenthau  agreed  to  another  50,000,000  purchase
in  five  semi-monthly  installments  of  ten  million  ounces  each,
and  in  July,   1938,   agreed  to  the  other  50,000,000  ounces  on
the  same  basis.     Therefore,   from  July,   1937,   to  July,   1938,
the  first  year  of  the  Sino-Japanese  war,  the  United  States
purchased  312,000,000  ounces  of  Chinese  silver  for  a  total
price   of  S138,ooo,ooo.9
China's  I.eserve  of  silver,  which  could  be  turned  into
credit  through  the  American  silver  purchase  policy,  was  almost
entirely  gone  ai;  the  end  of  the  first  year  of  warfare.     In
September,   1938,   the  Shanghai  banker,   K.   P.   Chen,   and  the
7Enl.,   pp.   32-33,61.
8E!ig-  P.  61.
9Ibid.
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manager  of  the  Chinese  Central  Bank's  Banking  Department,
Hsi  Te-mou,   came  to  Washington  seeking  additional  economic
assistance.    They  desired  to  sell  all  of  China's  remaining
silver  reserve,   some  85,000,000  ounces.     Of  this  amount,   some
9,000,000  ounces  were  in  Hong  Kong,   and  the  balance  of  76,000,
000  ounces  were  in  Iiondon.     The  United  States  Treasury  was
hesitant  to  make  this  purchase  as  65,000,000  ounces  of  the
silver  in  London  was  being  held  to  corner  credits  made  by
European  bankers.    But  after  China  was  able  to  pay  these
European  commitments  with  oi;her  funds,   the  entire  lot  of
silver  was  purchased  by  the  Treasury.     Iiater  in  1938,   some
18,500,000  ounces  were  collected  in  the  interior  of  China
and  sold  to  the  United  States.     This  was  followed  by  a!,final
purchase  of  6,000,000  ounces  in  1940-4.1.     So  in  all  the  United
States  Treasury  purchased  some  188,000,000  ounces  of  silver
worth  $94,000,000  up  to  July  8,   1937,   and  after  that  continued
the  program  with  purchases  of  362,000,000  ounces  valued  at
$157,000,000  through  |94i.L°
The  American  silver  purchase  policy,  after  its  initial
damaging  effect,   became  a,  policy  of  assistance  to  the  Chinese
national  economy.     The  purpose  of  the  policy  as  announced  in
a  public  statement  by  the  Secl.etary  of  Trea.sury  on  May  18,
1936,   was  to  aid  in  monetary  reform  and  to  provide  curl.ency
stabilization.11    By  1938,   the  Treasury  I)epartment  agreed  that
the  credits  gained  through  this  sale  of  silver  could  be  used
1°EEi±.,   p.   62.
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to  purchase  milital.y  supplies.L2    Also  the  Treasury  ceased  to
demand  i;hat  the  Chinese  goverrment  maintain  a  twenty-five  per-
cent  reserve  of  silver  to  back  notes  issued  and  to  continue
the  issuance  of  silver  coins.L3
With  the  heavy  flow  of  silver  moving  from  China  to  the
United  States  in  official  sales  to  obtain  for.eign  credits,  it
became  quite  evident  to  Secretary  of  Treasury  Morgenthau  and
others  of  the  United  States  and  Chinese  governments  that  this
program  could  not  continue  long.L4    The  Chinese  were  initiating
a  large  number  of  requests  for  assistance,  but  almost  all  were
denied  as  the  United  States  wished  to  avoid  a  confrontation
or  possible  hostilities  with  Japan.    Even  before  the  Marco
Polo  Bridge  incident,   the  Chinese  had  replaced  their  AmbassaLdor
to  the  United  States,   Alfred  Sze,   with  C.   T.  Wang  in  the  hopes
that  he  would  be  more  successful  in  obtaining  American
financial  and  material  assistance.     Ijater,  Ambassador  Wang
was  also  replaced  when  the   "distinguished  scholar"  Hu  Shih-
arrived  in  Washington  as  the  new  Chinese  Ambassador.L5
The  mood  of  Amel.ican  government  officials  was  one  of
sympathy  and  desire  to  help  China  in  her  desperate  situation,
but  the  question  was  how  to  help  and  at  the  same  time  to  remain
free  from  the  Asian  embl.oilment.     Secretary  Morgenthau  believed
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the  American  neutrality  laws  gave  an  undue  advantage  to  Japan,16
and  he  worked  to  assist  China  through  the  silver  purchase
program  and  suggested  various  types  of  loans.    Secretary  Hull
explains in  his  Memoirs  that  Generalissimo Chiang  Kai-she`k
wrote  him  a  personal  letter,  which  he  received  on  January  3,
1938,  asking  for  American  assistance.    He  states  that  President
Roosevelt  was  sympathetic,  but  they  were  unable  to  do  much  at
that  time;  therefore,  he  answered  Ohiang.s  letter  that  no
promise  of  direct  aid  could  be  made,  and  they  were  doing  all
Possible  to  bring  about  peace.17
At  first  numerous  ideas  for  assistance  to  China  were
discussed  and  formulated  by  officials  of  the  United  States
government  which  never  materialized  because  of  lack  of|, support
or  their  impracticability.    One  such  plan  was  devised  by  Sec-
retaries  Morgenthau  and  Wallace  to  arrange  a  loan  for  China
to  purchase  flour  and  cotton  goods  from  the  United  States.
Secretary  Morgenthau  presented  this  idea  to  Chinese  Ambassador
Wellington  Koo  in  Paris  on  July  26,  1938,   suggesting  that  he
send  K.  P.  Chen  to  Washington  to  look  into  this  matter.18
Ambassador  Bullitt  in  Paris  wrote  President  Roosevelt  on
August  8,   1938,   in  support  of  such  a  plan.19    The  Chinese
followed  up  on  this  plan  by  having  their  Ambassador  in  Wash-
ington  call  upon  Secretary  Hull  and  request  that  the  United
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States  $50,000,000  Cotton  and  Wheat  IIoan  of  1933  be  reinstated.2°
After  this  the  matter  drops  from  sight,  although  some  $32,000,
000  of  the  credit  had  been  unused,  and  there  is  doubt  that
China  could  have  gained  from  such  an  idea  at  that  time.21    other
plans  that  were  discussed  ranged  from  Colonel  Joseph  W.   Stilwell's
(the  American  militaLry  attache  in  China)  recommendation  for
credits  to  China  to  purchase  American  military  equipment  to
ideas  of  American  loans  through  such  agencies  as  the  Export-
Import  Bank.22
As  1938  continued,   many  members  of  the  State  Department
and  the  Foreign  Service  favored  assistance  to  China  or  for  a
stronger  position  against  Japanese  advances  in  Asia.    Even
after  the  fa±±]£  crisis,  Secretary  Hull  refused  to  supp`ort  such
views  and  his  position  mirror.ed  that  of  an  isolationist  congress
and  of  a  general  public  being  pacifist  in  outlook  and  opposing
foreign  involvements.23
Secretary  of  Interior  Ickes  indicated  in  his  diary  that
in  a  meeting  of  the  cabinet  on  Friday,   September  30,   1938,
"Henry  Morgenthau  brought  up  the  question  of  assisting  China
financially.     In  this  matter,   too,   the  sympathy  of  every  member
of  the  cabinet  was  clear.     We  would  like  to  help  China  if  we
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only  knew  how,   of  course  again  without  running  the  risk  of  our
own  involvement  in  war.w24
SecretaLry  Morgenthau  and  others  like-minded  soon  discovered
a  new  method  of  assisting  China  by  a  series  of  loans  made  to
China  through  the  United  States  Export-Import  Bank.     This  assis-
tance  was,   in  fact,  loans,  and  not  gI.ants  since  repayment  was
stipulated  to  be  made  in  agricultural  and  mineral  products  in
a  given  time  period.     This  series  of  Export-Import  Bank  loans
was  made  up  of  credits  of  $25,000,000  on  December  15,   1938;
$20,000,000   on  Mal'ch  7,   1940;   $25,000,000  on  September  25,
1940;   and  followed  by  a  $50,000,000  credit  announced  on  Novem-
ber  30,   1940,  with  an  additional  %50,000,000  credit  for
Currency  stabilization.25                                                              t,
Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek  sent  K.  P.   Chen,  an  advisor
to  the  Chinese  Finance  Ministry,   to  Washington  to  request  a
loan  in  October,   1938.     Upon  discussion  with  Chen,   Secretary
Morgenthau  and  President  Roosevelt  agreed  to  a  loan  of  $25,
000,000  through  the  Export-Import  Bank.     This  loan  of  December,
1938,  did  have  strings  aLttached-namely  that  none  of  the
money  could  be  used  to  purchase  arms  or  munitions,  but  it
could  be  used  for  other  desperately  needed  items  such  as
transporta,tion  equipment.    Also,   this  loan  was  to  be  repaid
in  shipments  of  tung  oil,   a  product  needed  in  Americals  paint
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industry.    When  these  funds  were  exhausted,  another  loan  from
the  Export-Import  Bank  of  $20,000,000  was  granted  on  March  7,
1940,  with  the  same  conditions  on  purchasing  and  the  same
method  of  repayment.26
It  should  be  pointed  out  that  Secretary  Morgenthau  only
agreed  to  the  Export-Import  loan  plan  after  he  had  obtained
assurances  from  Chairman  Jesse  Jones  of  the  Reconstruction
Finance  Corporation  of  the  legality  of  loans  from  the  Export-
Import  Bank,  and  after  assurances  from  Chiang  Kai-shek  that
C}iina  would  continue  in  her  resistance  to  Japanese  aggression.
Secretary  Hull  was  in  opposition  to  the  loan  plan,  and  it  was
during  his  attending  the  Pan-American  Conference  in  Iiima,  Peru
that  president  ROG{.`   -           `:`u`cided   to   approve   the   loan.2i7     The
first  loan  was  formally  extended  in  an  agreement  between  the
Export-Import  Bank  and  i;he  Universal  Trading  Corporation,  a
company  formed  by  the  Chinese  government  in  the  United  States
to  handle  foreign  credits.    As  mentioned  above  the  loan  was
to  be  repaid  in  tung  oil  and  there  was  an  interest  chargecl
of  four  and  one-half  percent.     In  addition  the  loan  was  uncon-
ditionally  guaranteed  by  the  Bank  of  China.    Also,   there  was
a  requirement  that  an  equal  amount  of  money,   $25,000,000,   be
spent  in  the  United  States  above  the  loan.     The  second  loan,
formally  signed  on  April  20,   1940,   had  much  the  same  conditions,
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but  the  interest  was  lower.ed  to  four  percent  and  the  required
spending  of  a  matching  amount  was  dropped.28
The  third  and  fourth  American  loans  were  granted  through
the  Export-Import  Bank  in  October  and  December  of  1940.     The
loan  formalized  in  October  was  armounced  on  September  25,   for
$25,000,000  and  the  December  loan  of  $50,000,000  on  November  30,
1940,   as  a  $100,000,000  credit  to  China,   onerhalf  to  be  used
for  currency  stabilization.    Chiang  Kai-shek  in  a  meeting  with
Ambassador  Nelson  Johnson  on  October  18,   1940,   asked  that  Pres-
ident  Roosevelt  be  informed  of  the  gI.ave  crisis  which  China
faced  at  the  time.     He  thanked  the  American  government  and  people
for  their  assistance  in  the  past  and  asked  for  even  more  assis-
tance  at  that  time.29    To  obtain  this  desired  assistance  the
Generalissimo  had  sent  his  brother-in-law,  Dr.   I.  V.  Soong,   to
Washington  for  negotiations.    Unlike  the  earlier  loans  these
two  of  $75,000,000  had  no  strings  attached  forbidding  their
use  to  pul.chase  arms  or  munitions.3°    These  loans  were  to  be
repaid  in  vitally  needed  metals,   such  as  tungsten,  antimony,
and  tin  for  the  American  armanent  program.51
The  announcement  of  the  granting  of  loans  by  the  Export-
Import  Bank  to  China  were  caLrefully  timed  to  offset  Japanese
successes  in  order  to  bolster  Chinese  morale  and  in  an  attempt
28E±.,  pp.  83,133.
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to  slow  Japan's  aggressive  policies.    The  first  loan  advanced,
$25,000,000  was  announced  in  December,   1938,   just  after  the
Chinese  defeat  in  the  Hankow  and  Canton  areas.     No  other  loans
were  forthcoming  until  the  $20,000,000  announced  in  March,   1940,
as  the  Japanese  were  installing  their  puppet  Nanking  government
of  Wang  Chins-wei.     A  third  credit  of  $25,000,000  was  armounced
in  September,  1940,   just  after  the  Japanese  advance  into  northern
Indochina.     The  final  loan  of  SIOO,000,OOO,   one-half  for  purchase
credit  and  the  other  for  currency  stabilization,  was  announced
on  November  30,   1940,   as  the  Japanese  government  was  granting
diplomatic  recognition  to  the  government  of  Wang  Ching-wei.32
Also,   i;he  Japanese  move  into  northern  Indochina  had  completely
stopped  shipments  on  the  Yunnan-Indochina  Railroad  andi. soon
thereafter  sufficent  pressure  was  placed  on  Great  Britain  for
a  temporary  closing  of  the  Burma  Road.33
The  Universal  Trading  Corporal;ion,   the  Chinese  purchasing
agent  in  the  United  States,  very  rapidly  set  about  using  the
funds  made  available  by  way  of  the  Export-Import  loans  under
the  required  terms  and  regulations  of  each  loan.    As  stated
earlier,  the  first  loan  was  largely  used    in  the  purchase  of
transportation  equipment.     Ovel'  one-half  of  the  initial  `q;25,
000,000  loan  was .used  in  orders  for  1,000  trucks  from  General
Motors  and  Chysler  Col.poration,  plus  gasoline,   tires,   and
spar.e  parts.     The  balance  of  this  loan  wa,s  used  for  road
building  equipment,   electric  equipment,   and  tools  needed  for
China  -America's
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China.s    arsenals.34    The  second  loan,   $20,000,000  in  March,
1940,  was  more  liberal  in  i;erms  of  goods  that  could  be  purchased,
including  commercial .aircraft  and  aircraft  parts.    Although
arms  and  munitions  were  not  available  for  purchase  from  this
loan,   items  that  were  sold,   such  as  the  aircraft,  in.otor  vehicles,
tools,   etc.,  were  easily  put  to  military  use.35    The  last  loans,
those   of  October  and  December  of  1940,   could  be  used  to  purchaLse
implements  of  warfare.
Of  the  $120,000,000  granted\ in  the  four  Impol.i-Export
loans  for  purchase  credits  from  December,   1938,   to  November,
1940,   the  credits  were  almost  entirely  repaid  by  June  30,   1949,
by  the  sale  of  tung  oil,  tin,  tungsten,  wolframite,  and
antimony,  as  specified  in  the  individual  loans.36    |n  a
letter  from  the  Federal  Ijoan  Administrator,  Mr.  Jesse  Jones,
to  President  Roosevelt, dated  November  50,   1940,   the  President
was  informed  that  China  was  up  to  the  required  repa,yment
schedule  in  deliveries  of  tung  oil  and  tin.37    0n  September  17,
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1941,   Chinese  Ambassador  Hu  Shin  infol'med  Herbert  Feis,   the
State  I)epartment  advisor  on  International  Economic  Affairs,
that  Chinese  shipments  of  tungsten  for  that  year's  loans
repayments  had  been  fulfilled.38    By  November,  1941,   China
had  repaid  some  $14,000,000  on  her  loan  debts,  which  was  well
ahead  of  the  stated  contracts.39
The  Unii;ed  States  became  deeply  inter.ested  and  involved  in
China's  problem  of  currency  stabilization  by  November  of  1940,
when  she  advanced  $50,000,000  to  China  for  the  purpose  of
currency  stabilizationt°  Along  with  the  United  States  loarh
Great  Britain  announced  a£5,OOO,OOO  loan  for  the  sane  purpose
and  Chinese  banks  put  up  some  ¢$20,000,000  for  currency  stabil-
ization.     These  funds  were  adminisiEred  by  the  Currency,,Stabil-
ization  Board  of  China  which  consisted  of  five  members,   three
Chinese,   one  American,   and  one  English  member.     The  aims  of
the  stabilization  loans  were  to  ''stabilize  foreign  exchange
value  of  Chinese  dollars  in  the  Shanghai  market  and  indirectly
arrest  inflationary  prices  in  Free  China."41    The  American  econ-
omic  advisor,   Mr.  Arthur  N.   Young,   to  Chiang  Kai-shelf     staLtes
that  the  purpose  of  the  loan  was  to   ''counter  Japanese  aggression
in  their  recognition  of  puppet  central  china.w42
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In  the  period  between  the  Marco  I'olo  Bridge  incident  on
July  7,   1937  and  the  end  of  1940,   the  United  Statesl  Asian
policy  made  great  changes  as  they  became  openly  pro-Chinese
with  assistance  forthcoming  and  increasing  with  the  passage  of
time  and  events.    At  first  her  policy  was  to  remain  neutral
and  uninvolved  in  the  conflict  if  at  all  possible.    This  is
evident  in  a  Chinese  attempt  to  pul'chase  surplus  Iiee-Enfield
rifles  from  the  United  States  War  Department,  via  a  British
company,   through  the  H.   Tanscher  Arms  Corporation  of  New  York
City  in  September,   1937.     The  War  Department  requested  advice
and  permission  from  the  State  Department  for  the  sale.     The
State  Department  refused  to  approve  the  deal  stating  that  it
would  be  contrary  to  the  neutrality  regulations.43         `
Ijater  in  the  summer  of  1938,   Secretary  Hull  took  a  slightly
firmer  line  against  Japan  and  showed  sympathy  for  China  when
he  established  his   ''moral  embargo"  by  asking  American  manufact-
urers  of  airplanes  to  refrain  from  sales  to  aggressive  nations
which  used  these  weapons  on  civilian  populations.44    Even
after  this  move,  Secreta,ry  Hull  tried  not  to  amtagonize  the
JaLpanese  and  with  the  approval  of  the  $20,000,000  Export-Import
cl.edit  to  China  in  March,   1940,   he  informed  Ambassador  Grew  in
Tokyo,  for  relay  to  the  Japanese  government,   that  this  credit
could  not  be  used  for  arms,  munitions,   or  other  implements  of
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war,   and  the  United  St.ates .was  to  be  repaid  for  the  loan  in
shipments  of  tin  and  other  ores.45
In  June,   1940,  wi.th  Dr;   I.  V.   Soong  in  the  United  States
seeking  additional  assistance,  a  Chinese-Russian-American
triangular  plan  of  assistance  was  discussed  and  planned.    Under
this  plan  the  United  States  would  purchase  such  materials  as
manganese,     chromite,   mercury,  mica,   etc.,   from  the  Soviet
Union  paying  in  advance.     The  Soviets  would  use  these  funds
to  provide  war  materials  to  the  Chinese,  which  would  be  illegal
for  the  United  States  to  do  because  of  the  neutrality  legislation.
This  plan  ended  in  failure  due  i;o  State  Department  disagreement
and  then  the  Soviet  Union  had  second  thoughts  fearing  possible
Japanese  reaction.46    By  the  time  of  Dr.  Soong's  visit i,in  June,
1940,   two  factors  seemed  clear,   "United  States  sympathy  lay
with  China's  cause  and  American  planners  see  very  possible  war
with  Japan  in  the  future."47    If  this  were  to  prove  correct,
then  China's  manpower  and  geographic  position  would  be  of  great
importance  to  the  United  States'   nationa,i  defense.    Even  with  this
general  feeling  among  high  goverrment  officials  there  was  the
feaLr  that  solid  steps  at  that  time  would  make  the  Japanese-
German  Alliance  even  stronger  and  in  i;urn  damage  the  position
of  Great  Britain.48    This  feeling  is  reflected  in  the  denial
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of  a  Chinese  request  to  purchase  540  to  720  surplus  World  War
I  75mm  field  guns  from  the  United  States  Arny.49
By  September,  1940,   the  fears  of  a  firmer  Axis  Alliance
became  fulfilled  with  the  announcement  of  the  Three-Power
Pact.5°    ]he  day  before  this  alliance  was  to  be  armounced,   on
September  26,   1940,   the  administration  announced  the  $25,000,
COO  credit  to  China.     Also  on  the  day  of  the  pa6t's  announcement,
Secretary  Hull  armounced  that  effective  October  16,  1940,
licenses  would  be  required  for  the  export  of  iron  and  steel
scrap.    This  action  constituted  an  embargo  on  scrap  against
Japan'51
0n  October  23,   1940,   Ambassa,dor  Johnson  in  Ohungking
cabled  Secretary  Hull  about  more  assistance  for  the  Chinese,
stating  that  China  had  been  in  war  for  three  years  and  was
economically  and  militarily  exhausted  and  that  he  believed  aid
should  be  forthcoming.52    Secretary  Ickes  reported  the  feelings
of  top  government  officia.Is  in  this  passage  from  his  diary  of
a  cabinet  meeting,   ''We  discussed  the  possibility  of  lending
more  money  to  China.     It  is  recognized  that  the  longer  and  the
more  effectively  China  can  resist  Japanese  aggression,  the
better  it  will  be  for  us  in  the  Far  East.w53
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In  November,   1940,   Chiang  Kai-shek  was  seeking  a  concrete
offer  of  a  large  military  credit  and  promised  if  it  were  granted
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  would  have  freedom  to  use
Chinese  ports  and  airfields  if  they  became  involved  in  war  with
Japan.54    President  Roosevelt  largely  presented  the  feelings  of
his  administration  in  a  statement  of  November  11,  1940,   in
which  he  branded  the   ''lnew  ordersl   as   .counterfeitl   and  said
that  China  is  receiving  incl'easing  aid  which  the  arsenal  of
democracy  is  supplying  to  those  countries  which  resist  the
aggressors.n55
54Langer  and  Gleason,  I±
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The  seriousness  of  the  United  States'  feeling  to  assist
China  in  her  struggle  against  Japanese  aggression  came` to  the
forefront  in  late  1940  and  early  1941.     In  December,  1940,
the  American  goverrmient  faced  up  to  the  fact  that. Great  Britain,
China,  and  other  nations  at  war  against  the  Axis  powers  were
unable  to  obtain  enough  arms  from  this  country  to  continue
f ighting  unless  there  was  a  change  in  policy  from  the  cash
and  carry  provisions.    The  steps  that  had  been  taken,  with
loans  to  the  Chinese,   sales  of  surplus  World  War  I  armaments
to  Britain,  the  selling  of  arms  and  munitions  on  a  cash
and  carry  basis,  and  others  had  not  proved  to  be  enough--
something  much  greater  was  needed.    In  the  light  of  this  feeling
(76)
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President  Roosevelt  proposed  his  Lend-Lease  idea  to  the  nation
in  a  press  conference  on  December  17,   1940.1
In  November,   1940,  Ambassador  Johnson  in  China  informed
Secretary  Hull  that  Chinals  source  of  assistance  from  the
Soviet  Union  was  drying  up.2    Following  this,  President
Roosevelt,   in  his  radio  address  of  December  29,  1940,  presented
to  the  public  the  idea  that  the  United  States  was  and  must  be
''the  great  al'senal  of  democracy"  and  on  January  6,  1941,   stated
that  the  United  States  was  committed  ''to  full  support  of  all
those  resolute  peoples,   everywhere,  who  are  resisting  aggression
and  are  thereby  keeping  war  away  from  our  hemisphere.W3    Taking
action  on  these  comments  President  Roosevelt  dispatched  in.
Iiauchlin  Currie,  a  principal  economic  advisor  of  the  President,
to  China  to  survey  the  needs  of  that  nation  and  to  prepare
recormendations  for  a  greater  United  States  assistance  progran.4
The  United  States  Congress  debated  the  issues  involved
in  the  Lend-ELease  proposal  and  on  March  11,   1941,   passed  this
piece  of  extraordinary  legislation.    This  legislation  meant
that  the  United  States  government   "placed  its  resources  aLnd
its  industrial  capacity  at  the  disposal  of  foreign  nations
who  served  America.s  interests  by  helping  to  accomplish  that
aim.     Great  BI.itain,  China,  and  Greece  were  the  three  belligerent
|stettinius, Iiend-Iiease pp.   5-4.
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nations  specifically  named  in  that  first  bill."5  Mr.  Edward  R.
Stettinius,  an  administration  official  who  was  later  to  be
named  director  of  the  IIend-I.ease  program,   commented  on  the
program  thus:     ''We  would  send  weapons  abroad  to  help  the  nations
still  holding  the  Axis  in  check.    Meanwhile,  here  in  the
United  States,  we  would  arm  and  train  a  great  military  force
to  protect  ourselves  if  we  also  were  attacked."6    President
Roosevelt  signed  the  Iiend-Iiease  bill  on  March  15,  1941,  four
days  after  the  billls  passage,7
in.  IIauchlin  Currie  returned  from  his  trip  to  China  and
filed  his  report  with  the  President  on  March  15,  1941.    Currie
reported  that  the  Chinese  faced  problems  of  unity  and  morale
because  of  the  ''red"  element,  a  great  economic  probleml because
of  inflation,  high  taxes,  and  the  cutting  off  of  almost  all  outside
trade,  and  a  serious  problem  of  an  ill-equipped  army  and  air  force.
Recommendations  of  American  assistance  called  for  export  and
currency  stabilization  loans,  military  assistance,  finances
fd[a Burma  railroad,  and  weighing  Chinese  needs  equally  with
those  of  Britain,  Greece,  and  our  own  in  assistance  programs.
Also,  Dr.  Currie  recommended  that  he  be  placed  ''in  some  capac-
ity  to  ensure  that  Chinese  needs  for  maLterial,  priorities,
etc„  are  given  proper  consideration.W8
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nations  specifically  naLmed  in  that  first  bill."5    Mr.  Edward  R.
Stettinius,  an  administration  official  who  was  later  to  1)e
naLmed  director  of  the  Lend-Lease  program,   commented  on  the
program  thus   ''We  would  send  weapons  abroad  to  help  the  nations
still  holding  the  Axis  in  check.    Meanwhile,  here  in  the
United  States,  we  would  al.in  and  train  a  great  military  force
to  protect  ourselves  if  we  also  were  attacked."6    President
Roosevelt  signed  the  Iiend-Iiease  bill  on  March  15,   1941,   four
days  after  the  billls  passage.7
Dr.  Lauchlin  Currie  I`eturned  from  his  trip  to  China  and
filed  his  report  with  the  I'resident  on  March  15,  1941.     Currie
reported  that  the  Chinese  faced  problems  of  unity  and  morale
because  of  the   ''red"  element,   a  great  economic  problem,because
of  inflation,  high  taxes,  and  the  cutting  off  of  almost  all
outside  tl.ade,  and  a  greatly  ill-equipped  army  and  air  force.
Recommendations  of  American  assistance  called  for  export  and
currency  stabilization  loans,  military  assistance,  finances
for  a  Burma  railroad,   and  weighing  Chinese  needs  equally  with
those  of  Britain,   Greece,   and  our  own  in  assistance  programs.
Also,   Dr.   Currie  recommended  that  he  be  placed  ''in  some  capac-
ity  to  ensure  that  Chinese  needs  for  material,  priorities,
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In  an  address  to  the  White  House  Correspondents'   Assoc-
iation  on  March  15,1941,   the  day  of  Dr.   Currie's  report,
President  Roosevelt  declared  that  Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek
and  his  brave  people  would  get  the  necessary  help  and  assist-
ance  that  they  had  requested  and  so  greatly  deserved.9    General-
issimo  Chiang  Kai-shek  thanked  the  President  and  the  American
people  in  the  following  message  of  March  18,1941:
The  people  of  China,  whether  engaged  in  fighting  the
aggressor  or  toiling  in  the  fields  and  workshops  in
the  rear  in  support  of  the  defenders,  will  be  immeasur-
ably  heartened  t>y  your  impressive  reaffirmation  of  the
will  of  the  American  people  to  assist  them  in  their
struggle  for  freedom  from  foreign  domination,  and  in
:g:±==S#:±±::  3:rt£:i:]8arch  towards  democracy  and
It  was  later,on  May  6,1941,   that  the  President  declared  ''the
I
defense  of  China  to  be  vital  to  the  defense  of  the  United
States"  but  the  formal  Master  Iiend-Ijease  Agreement  with  China
was  not  signed  until  June  2,   |942.LL
With  the  passage  of  Iiend-Lease,   Dr.   I.   V.   Soong  chartered
a  corporation,  China  Defense  Supplies,   Inc.,   to  act  as  agent
for  the  Chinese  government  in  Lend-Lease  transactions.     Dr.
Soong,  himself,  became  the  corporation's  president  and  the
staff  largely  consisted  of  American  businessmen.     I'residential
assistant  Harry  Hopkins  assigned  Dr.  La,uchlin  Currie,  as  he
had  requested,   ''primary  responsibility  in  developing  our
9Tones  and  Myers, I)ocuments,   Ill.   40.
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contacts  with  the  Chinese  Government  in  the  administration  of
the  Lend-I|ease  Bill. wl2
At  a  meeting  of  the  Interdepartmental  Committee  for
Coordination  of  Foreign  and  Domestic  Military  Purchases,
attended  by  General .Burns  of  the  War  I)epartment,  Mr.  Lynn  R.
Edminister,   special  assistant  to  Secretary  Hull,  and  Dr.  Ijauchlin
Currie,   Dr.   Soong  presented  what  would  be  China's  most  urgent
needs.    His  list  included  airplanes,  arsenal  materiel,  ordnance,
signal  equipment,  motor  transport,   and  most  importantly  cargo
transport  space  aboard  American  vessels  sailing  from  the  Amer-
ican  I'acific  coast  to  Rangoon.     He  stated  that  foreign  vessels
by  alternate  routes  caused  undue  delays.L3    Three  days  later,
on  March  31,   1941,   I)r.   Soong  presented  his  first  formali,  com-
prehensive  request  for  assistance  under  the  Iiend-Iiease  pro-
visions.     This  request  consisted  of  equipment  and  training  in
three  different  areas.    The  first  item  was  equipment  for  a
modern  air  force  of  one  thousand  aircraft,   consisting  of  three-
hundl'ed  bombers  and  seven-hundred  pursuit  type  aircraft.
Secondly,  he  requested  modern  equipment  and  weapons  to  outfit
thirty  divisions  to  become  the  nucleus  of  a  new  Chinese  army.
Thirdly,   and  probably  most  important  at  the  time,  was  a  request
for`  cormunications  and  tl.ansportation  equipment.     This  third
item  specifically  named  the  following:
L2united  states  Department  of  tpe.Army.  ||±i¥£,£±±£££  A=El£
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An  efficient  line  of  communications  between  China
f¥8mf±#gyt8°¥£:SB#±£::R£:Zw:y:={3y-8aE!:h::S]Way
from  Sadiya,  India,  across  north  Burma  to  China,
{#:::i:±dr£:::§±;::#:pxs :::==a€L:8 :3;p±::ent
Dr.  Soong' s  proposals  for  assistance  under  Iiend-Iiease
almost  immediately  ran  into  numerous  difficulties,  not  the
least  of    these  being  short  supply,  numerous  orders  frori  other
countries,  and  our  own  rearmament  program.    Even  if  all  the
items  had  been  readily  available,  the  War  I)epartment,  which
processed  such  orders,  found  the  Soong  request  lacking  many
necessary  details  and  specifications  to  rapidly  fill  or  even
consider  the  requests.    Exanples  of  this  lack  of  detail  are
evident  in  an  order  for  30,000  tons  of  railroad  rails  vtith
specifications  omitted,  request  for  four-ton  trucks  which
would  be  inoperable  on  the  unimproved  roads  of  China,  and
request  for  ''some"  spare  parts  with  no  estimates .on  items
and  quantity.L5    Another  request  that  caused  disagreement  and
confusion  was  an  order  for  50,000  M-1  Garand  semi-automatic
rifles.    The  supply  of  the  weapons  was  inadequate  for  the
United  States  military  forces  at  that  time,  so  there  was  the
offer  of  50,000  m917-A  (Enfield)   .30  caliber  rifles.    Dr.
Soong  at  I irst  refused  the  weapons  on  the  grounds  that  the
acceptance  would  "jeopaLrdize  his  reputation."    Later  he  ac-
cepted  the  weapons  and  arranged  to  have  them  converted  to
L4Romanus  and  Sunderland,
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semi-automatic  Weapons  by  a  New  York  manufacturing  firm.     The
conversion  of  the  weapons  proved  to  be  unsatisfactory.,  then
Dr.  Soong  played  with  the  idea  of  shipping  the  50,000  rifles
to  China  to  be  converted  to  7.92  mm  caliber.     This  plan  failed
to  be  carried  through  and  this  probably  was  a  good  thing
because  it  would  have  taken  enormous  amounts  of  time  if  it
could  even  have  been  successfully  carried  out.    Eventually
some   30,000  of  i;hese  weapons  were   sent  to  the  Chinese  forces
in  India  in  February,  1942,  and  used  in  the  China-Burma-
India  Theater  operations.t6
0n  April  22,   1941,   the  War  Department  presented  to  Dr.
Currie  a  preliminary  report  on  Dr.   Soong's  China  assistance
request.     Almost  all  items  were  reduced  in  amounts  and!avail-
ability  dates  scheduled  months  in  the  future.    With  this  infor-
mation  about  limited  supplies  and  future  availability  dates,
I)r.   Soong  made  a  revised  request  proposal  on  May  1,   1941.17
Dr.   Currie  secured  many  of  the  items  requested  and  on  May  6,
1941,   obtained  from  President  Roosevelt  an  allocation  of  $45,
loo,000  for  transportation  and  constl`uction  equipment.18    Items
on  this  first;  order  la.rgely  consisted  of  road  building  equip-
ment,   trucks,   petroleum  products,   railway  equipment,   and
7. 92  :;#iinpii£ZtarSr¥:f±:¥g£:8eg?±££:;ec%±:b6:it':3  g€:tes.
standard  size  was  the   .30  caliber..     This  caused  great  difficulty
in  obtaining  ammunition  I`or  the  weapons  then  used  by  the
8±£:e.::r:±i,::g:Xsaf8r:V:£  ::::)Problems  later  as  two  different
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arsenal  material.    Aircraft  and  the  necessary  arms  and  equip-
ment  for  the  thirty  division  rebuilding  program  were  scheduled
for  delivery  no  earlier  than  mid-|942.19
Generalissimo  Chiang  Kai-shek,   I)r.   I.   V.   Soong,   and  the
Chinese  people  did  not  find  the  passage  of  Iiend-Lease  to  be
the  great  store  house  of  assistance  they  had  hoped  for  and  re-
quested  so  long.     Where  China's  problem  in  obtaining  necessary
armament  and  equipment  in  the  past  had  been  lack  of  purchase
power  or  credii;s,   she  now  faced  the  problem  of  competing
demands  for  like  items  from  Great  BI.itain,   Greece,   the  Soviet
Union  after  June,  1941,   and  numerous  smaller  nations.     If  this
would  not  be  competition  enough,   the  United  States  was  in  a
great  rearmament  progran  of  its  own.2°    Not  only  wouldl compe-
tition  for  military  supplies  have  been  trouble  enough  for  China,
but  she  found  herself  with  less  than  equal  footing  with  Great
Britain  and  other  nations.    Where  Great  Britain  played  a  large
role  in  the  planning  of  Ijend-IIease,   China's  was  a  very  minor
role.     It  has  been  suggested  that  China  did  receive  aid  because
of  the  British  Empire  and  other  European  holdings  in  south  Asia.
This  line  of  reasoning-  is  that  the  administration  desired  to
see  Japan  contained  in  the  China  struggle  thus  not  being  free
for  further  agf?ression  into  southern  and  Southeast;  Asia,   and
wi-th  this  in  mind  during  the  planning  for  Ijend-Ijease,  Dr.  Currie
was  sent  on  his  fact-finding  mission  to  China.2L
]9Romanus  and  Sunderland,
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Dr.  Currie  took  his  mission  to  heart  and  worked  toward
obtaining  the  necessary  and  a,vailable  assistance  for  the  Chinese.
On  May  10,   1941,   Chiang  Kai-shek  addressed  a  farewell  dinner
for  the  departing  Ambassador  Nelson  I.   Johnson.     In  his  address
Chiang  asked  the  friendly  nations  to  support  China  by  granting
war  matel.ial  and  economic  aid.     He  explained  that   "expeditionary
forces  or  naval  action  is  not  asked  of  them.W22    Responding,
on  June  2,   1941,  Dr.   Currie  cabled  Chiang  of  United  States
plans  to  aid  both  Great  Britain  and  China  ''as  urgent  needs  of
each  calls  for   .... w23
Even  with  Dr.  Currie's  assurances  and  si;eadfast  assistance,
"Chiang  was  literally  receiving  the  run-around  in  Washington
as  requests  bounced  from  department  to  department  and  from
Americans  to  British  and  back  again,"24  and  soon  the  Chinese
discovered  that  not  only  was  she  t>ehind  the  United  States  and
G.reat  Brita,in  on  the  waiting  list  but  also  in  a  position  behind
the  Soviet  Union.25    At  times,   because  of  the  drain  on  the  United
States  low  production,  after    the  needs  of  our  own,   the  British,
the  Russians  were  subtracted,   ''for  China  was  left  a  minus
quantity."26
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Studies  conducted  by  the  State  I)epartment  iri  April,  1941,
showed  that  since  1937,  China  had  received  less  that  $200,000,
000  in  loans  and  credits,  and  of  this  amount  only  approximately
$25,000,000  had  been  available  for  arms  and  munitions.     The
pro-Chinese  members  of  the  State  Department  were  "shocked  by
the  realization  of  how  little  had  been  done.W27    one  member
of  the  State  Department  that  worked  to  expose  how  little  had
been  done  for  China  was  Mr.   Stanley  K.  Hornbeck,  Advisor  on
Political  Relations  to  the  Secretary  of  State.     In  a  memorandum
on  June  12,  1941,  to  SecretaLry  Hull,  Hornbeck  specifically  pointed
to  the  small  degree  of  assistance  given  to  China.    Pointed  out
was  the  fact  that  in  1940  Great  Britain received  thirteen  times
as  many  goods  as  did  China,  and  in  the  months  January-haarch,
1941,  Great  Britain  received  fourteen  times  the  anounts  shipped
to  China.     Of  the  $4,000,000,000  allocated  under  the  Iiend-Lease
Act,   through  June  12,  1941,   only  $45,loo,000  had  been  allocated
to  China,  some  ratio  of  98  to  100  units  for  other  countries,
mostly  the  British,  for  each  one  unit  to  China.28    Dr.  Soong.s
understanding  and  feelings  of  China's  inability  to  obtain  rapid
delivery  of  war  materials  under  the  Iiend-Iiease  provisions  is
demonstrated  in  a  letter  from  Dr.  Soong  to  Colonel  William  J.
Donovan.     Soong  criticized    the  American  sale  of  petroleum  pro-
ducts  to  the  Japanese,  and  the  delivery  of  aircraft  to  the  Soviet
Union  while  they  are  "unatailable"  to  the  Chinese.    Soong  went
27Langer  and  Gleasoni  E±
28EEEE,  RE,  V.  66o-661.
The  Undeclared EE,  P.  490.
86
even  farther  to  state  `that:
Our  resistance  is  just  a  pawn  in  the  calculations  of
other  democratic  powers.     Japan  is  being  furnished
the  materials  with  which  to  destroy  us  in  order  to
relieve  the  British  from  attack  in  the  south  and  maybe
even  the  Russians  from  attack  in  the  north.    Although
we  are  being  given  polite  non-offensive  aid  like  road
materials  and  trucks,  nothing  which  would  really  offend
Japan  or  give  us  striking  power  of  retribution  against
Japari  is  being  allowed  to  actually  get  there  -  even
i:o:g:i!:5;es:EE:3::!:i;of;:x:::ef:i::!:nsi:eR::::=:?29
Gradually,   due  to  the  actions  of  in.   Soong,  Dr.  Currie,  and
Hornbeck's  studies,   China  was  able  to  get  an  assistance  program
worked  out  and  start  receiving  the  much-sought-after  and  needed
aid.    By  July,  1941,  a  full  prograln  of  assistance  to  China  be-
came  established  p61iey  under  the  Lend-Ijease  provisions.30
Perhaps  the  greatest  problem  facing  China  in  rece`iving
foreign  assistance,   once  granted,  was  one  of  transportation.
Almost  immediately  with  the  beginning  of  hostilities,   the  Jap-
anese  strateg`y  became  one  of  blockade  or  cutting  the  Chinese
off  from  sources  of  outside  assistance.     China  was  unable  to
maintain  access  to  the  sea  in  the  early  months  of  war  as  she
was  forced  to  trade  time  and  space  to  organize  resistance  and
attempt  to  obtain  foreign  assista,nee.31    The  I.esult  was  that
China  rapidly  became  virtually  isolated  from  the  outside  world.
With  the  Japanese  move  into  French  Indochina,   the  only  routes
to  China    were   the  overland  trading  paths  from  the  Soviet  Union
and  the  Burma  Road.
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Once  China  became  included  in  the  Iiend-Iiease  provisions
with  a  solid  program  of  assistaLnce,   the  first  problem  encount-
ered  was  th_at  great  ''bottleneck  of  transportation, ''  the  Burma
Road.     This  road  had  been  started  in  1937  by  some  one-half
million  Chinese  laborers  and  opened  the  following  year.     The
road  consisted  of  715  miles  of  rough  dirt  road  between  the
Rangoon-Iiashio  Railroad  tel.minal  at  Iiashio,  Burma,   to  Kurming
in  Yunnan  Province,   China.32    From  the  time  of  the  construction
of  the  road,  Americans  haLd  been  involved  iri  advising  and
consulting  the  Chinese  government.     In  June  and  July  of  1938,
Mr.  Jtilean  Arnold,   an  American  Commercial  Atta,che,   had  invest-
igated  the  roadway, pointing  out  needs  of  maintenance  and  service
centers.     After  this  the  Chinese  engaged  Mr.   D.  F.  Myers,   an
American  automotive  expert,   for  assistance.     Myers  advised  on
making  the  road  usable  under  all  weather  conditions  and  the
use  of  repair  shops.     In  July  of  1939,   the  Chinese  government
invited  an  American  mission,   led  by  Mr.   M.   E.   Sheahan,   a  Chicago
trucking  operator,   to  study  the  road.    This  mission  filed  re-
ports  of  needed  improvements  such  as  surfacing  and  drainage  of
the  roadbed,  maintenance  and  repair  shops,  regulation  of  traffic,
and  training  and  better  wages  for  drivers.33
When  the  British  reopened  the  Burma  Road  in  October,   1940,
after  its  temporary  closing  due  to  Japanese  pressures,  the
Chinese  had  some  loo,000  tons  of  vitally  needed  equipment  on
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road  was  30,000  tons  monthly,  bui;  in  truth  rarely  did  the  ton-
nage  from  Iiashio  to  Ku]rming  equal  5,000  tons,  and  in  February,
194.1,   it  was  down  to.3,OO0  tons.     At  that  time  the  Chinese
government  obtained  the  services  of  Mr.   Jo]m  Earle  Baker,  who
served  prior  to  this  as  administrative  director  of  the  American
Red  Cross  China  Program,   as  Director  General  of  the  Burma  High-
way  Commission.     Under  Baker's  leadership  the  traffic  increased
and  tonnage  improved  from  the  3,000  tons  of  February  to  10,000
tons  in  April.34
With  Dr.   Cul`rie's  return  from  China  in  March,   1941,   a
transportation  mission  was  selected  to  go  to  China  and  study
the  problems  of  the  Burma  road  and  to  make  suggestions  for  its
improvement.     This  mission  was  composed  of  Mr.   Daniel  4rnstein,
president  of  the  Terminal  Cab  Company  of  New  York  City,   and
Mr.  Marco  Hellmam  and  Mr.   Harold  Da,vis  of  the  trucking  industry.
This  mission  arrived  in  Chungking  by  air  on  July  12,   1941.
`  From  Chungking  they  traveled  to  Kunming  and  then  via  the  Burma
Road  to  Rangoon,   and  then  reversed  their  travel  back  via  the
Burma  Road  to  Chungking  with  a  report  on  improvements  for  the
road.     Their  recommendations  called  for  more  truck  terminals
and  repair  centers  spaced  one  da,y's  travel  apart  on  the  road
arid  for  these  centers  to  be  fully  equipped  with  spare  parts,
lubricants,   etc.,   and  staffed  with  trained  mechanics.    Also,
they  recommended  a  reduction  in  provincial  tolls  and  keeping
toll  stations  open  for  longer  hour.s.35
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With  the  Arnstein  recommendations  in,   the  Chinese  and
American  governments  began  to  make  improvements  on  the  road
and  its  connected  problems.     The  Chinese  started  a  program
of  hard-surfacing  the  road  in  the  summer  and  fall  of  1941,
using  the  tons  of  Iiend-Iiease  asphalt  and  grading  equipment
being  shipped  from  the  United  States.     In  July,   1941,   Ijend-
Iiease  trucks  and  spare  parts  began  arriving  in  considerable
numbers.     In  August  a  truck  assembly  plant  was  established
in  Rangoon  and  many  of  the  service  centers  along  the  road  were
stocked  with  spare  par.ts  a,nd  supplies.36    In  october  and
November  of  1941,   Burma  Road  tonnage  had  incl.eased  to  approx-
imately  15,000  tons  a  month  with  even  prospects  of  reaching
some   35,000  tons  per  month  in  1942.37                                        ,
An  alternate  means  of  transportation  other  than  the  Burma
Road  was  being  constructed  by  the  Chinese  at  the  time  improve-
ments  were  being  made  on  the  road.     In  1938,   China  started  con-
struction  of  a  railroad  that  was  to  travel  from  Kurming  to  Iiashio
and  there  conneci;  with  the  existing  ra,ilroad  to  RaLngoon.     By  the
spring  of  1941,   the  roadbed  had  been  completed  in  the  Chinese
section  with  rails  being    used  from  the  Yunnan  section  of  the
closed  Indochina  Ra,ill.oad  and  even  sorrie  rails  slipped  fl.om
behind  Japanese  lines  in  occupied  China.     In  March,   1941,   the
BI.itish  governlnent  pledged  to  provide  the  financing  and  engi-
neering  assistance  to  Bul`ma  for  construction  of  the  I.ailway
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in  Burma.38    In  April,  1941,   the  United  States  became  involved
as  the  War  Department  sent  Major  John  E.  Ausland,   a  former
official  of  the  Chicago,  Burlingi;on  and  Quincy  Railroad,   to
Burma  as  an  American  advisor  and  to  obtain  Iiend-Iiease  assistance
for  construction.     Major  Ausland  worked  with  Sir  John  Rowland
from  i;he  Burma  Government,   and  General  Tseng  Yang-fu  of  China
on  the  railroad  project.     Lend-IIease  aid  was  used  in  placing
some  ninety  percent  of  the  needed  equipment  and  supplies  on
order  in  the  United  States.     In  one  incident  the  War  Department
purchased  125  miles  of  abandoned  narrow-gage  railroad  track
from  the  I)enver  and  Rio  Grande  Western  Railroad  for  use  on
the  Yurman  Railroad  project.39    Also,   twenty  steam  locomotives
were  placed  .on  order  with  the  American  Ijocomotive  Company  to
be  completed  and  delivered  by  mid-1943.4°
One  of  the  greatest  hazards  in  construction  of  the  rail-
road  wa.s  malaria  which  i;ook  the  lives  ,of  thousands  of  Chinese
workers.     The  problem  was  so  bad  that  on  July  19,   1941,   Pres-
ident  Roosevelt  announced  that  funds  had  been  allocated  to  send
a  United  States  Public  Health  Sel.vice  team  to  Burma  for  malal.ia
control  and  medical  assistance.41    This  medical  mission  was
a  joint  effort  of  the  Chinese  and  American  governments  and
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the  Rockefeller  Foundation.42     Iiend-Iiease  funds  of  $1,COO,000
were  allocated  to  the  Public  Health  Service  for  the  mission,
A  sixteen  member  medical  team  under  Dr.   Victor  H.   Hags,   complete
with  field  hospital,  was  transported  to  the  Yunnan  Railroad
site.     The  situation  was  so  bad  that  oui;  of  one  construction
gang  of  2,000  Chinese  laborers,   over  400  had  died  of  the  disease,
600  had  fled,   and  approximately  800  of  the  remaining  i,000
were  ill  with  malaria.43
Almost  all  of  the  work  and  assistance  put  into  the  Burma
Road  project  and  the  Yunnan  Railroad  proved  to  be  in  vain  as
shortly  after  the  Pearl  Hal.bor  attack  Burma  was  occupied  by
the  Japanese  and  this  effectively  sealed  China  off  from
surface  support  via  south  Asia.     Other  tha.n  the  trading
routes  through  Central  Asia  to  the  Soviet  Union,   China  was
cut  off  from  outside  assistance  and  communica,tions  except
through  the  air.     Use  of  the  air  routes  was  taking  place  before
the  capture  of  Burma.     Pan-American  Airline  had  operated
commercial  flights  from  the  Philippines  to  Hong  Kong  since
1935.     FI.om  Hone.  Kong  to  China's  interior,   flights  wel.e  main-
tained  over  the  Japanese  lines  by  the  China  National  Aviation
Corporation.     By  way  of  this  transporta!tion  link  many  des-
perately  needed  items  were  transpol`ted  to  China.     Of  course
as  was  the  Burma  Road,   this  link  was  broken  by  the  Japanese
once  this  Asian  war  developed  into  a  world  wa,r.44     Items
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carried  in  via  the  Philippine-Hong  Ko.ng  air  link  were  for  the
most  part  medicines,   gasoline,   aLnd  `banknotes,  with  the  out-
going  flights  carrying  tungsten  and  other  items  for  the  I.e-
payment  of  United  States  Expol.t-Import  Bank  credits.45    |n
the  later  part  of  1940,  the  China  National  Aviation  Corporation
obtained  the  rights  to  fly  into  India,  with  the  first  survey
flight  over  the   "hump"  made  on  November  24,   1941.     This  was
the  route  that  proved  so  important  to  transporta,tion  and
communications  in  the  years  after  Peal.i  Harbor.46
Just  as  the  Chinese  had  need  of  technical  and  professional
assistance  in  improvement  and  construction  of  transportation
and  communications  links  \.7ith  the  friendly  powers,   so  there
was  the  need  for  this  type  of  assistance  to  rebuild  the  Chinese
military  forces.    The  Chinese  milita.ry  had  little  understand-
ing  of  American  weapons  and  material,   their  military  assistance
of  the  past  had  been  fl.om  Germany  a.nd  then  from  the  Soviet
Union.     To  effectively  use  and  request  Americari  military  equip-
ment  an  Amel`ican  military  mission  \.,'as  necessary  to  provide
training  and  technical  assistance.47    These  and  other  reasons
for  a  military  mission  in  connection  with  i;he  Iiend-Lease  program
were  cited  by  member.s  of  the  State  and  War  Departments.     In
addition  to  advising  on  requisitions  a  military  mission  could
develop    an  overall  Lend-I.ease  Program  that  would  mesh  with
the  programs  of  other  countries,  provide  training  and  advising
China  and  the_   __L=_ =L=     =i===           _
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teams,  ensure  the  proper  distribution  of  equipment  and  end
waste,   obtain  the  proper  equipment  for  the  Chinese  air  force,
and  provide  a  co-operative  staff  in  case  the  United  States
became  involved  in  the  Sino-Japanese  conflict.48    0n  July  3,
1941,   Genel.al  MaLrshall  approved  an  American  Military  Mission
for  China  and  on  July  12,   selected  Brigadier-General  John
Magruder  to  head  this  mission.49    The  General  had  served  two
tours  of  duty  in  China  as  a  military  attache.5°    President
Roosevelt  announced  this  decision  in  a  press  conference  on
August  26,   |94i.51
The  War  Department's  orders  to  General  Magruder  detailed
the  role  of  the  mission  as  one  of  advising  and  assisting  the
Chinese  government  in  procurement  of  Ijend-Iiease  supplies,
training  Chinese  personnel  in  the  use  of  new  equipment,   and
working  with  all  Departments  of  the  United  States  goverrment
in  their  I.oles  of  assistance  under  Lend-Lease.     Also,   General
Magruder  i;as  requested  to  make  a  detailed  study  of  all  possible
communication  and  transportation  links  from  China,.52
The  American  Military  I`.fission  to  China  was  divided  into
several  sub-groups  for  opel`ational  and  functional  purposes.
One  group  was  established  with  the  Chinese  government  and
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military,  another  in  Rangoon  to  work  with  the  transport  of
goods  along  the  Burma  Road,   and  the  third  group  was  to  remain
in  Washington  to  act  as  a  liaison  and  assistance  group  between
China  I)efense  Suppliers  and  the  various  departments  and  agencies
of  the  United  States  goverrment.53
The  first  group  of  military  advisors  arrived  in  Chungking
by  way  of  air  from  Manila  and  Hone.  Kong  on  September  13,   1941.
General  Magruder  arrived  in  the  Chinese  wartime  ca,pital  on
October  I.0,   1941,   and  ci.ssiGned  si;aff  members  in  the  areas  of
communication,  aviation,  military  supply,  arsenals,  and  mil-
itary  training.54    0n  october  22,  1941,   the  first  weapon  ship-
ment  arrived  in  Ran6roon  on  the  Americari  ship  SS Tulsa.     This
shipment  contained  thirty-five  scout  cars,   forty-eight'i, 75  mm
howitzers,   one-hundred  .50  caliber  machine  guns,   eleven-thou-
sand  Thompson  sub-machine  guns,   five-hundred  Bren  guns,   and
a,large  quantity  of  ammunition  for  these  weapons.55    By  Nov-
em.Per,   1941,   i;he   staff  of  the  American  I\flilitary  Plission  was
two-thirds  completed  with  t\`/enty  officers  on  assignment  in
China  and  Burma.56
China.  had  better  luck  in  receiving  aviation  assistance
from  the  United  States  than  assistance  in  any  other  area..
Even  befol.e  i;he  Sino-Japanese  conflict  had  begun,   Americans
had  been  involved  in  China's  military  a,viation  program.     As
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early  as  1931,   John  H.   Jouett,   am  American  Army  retired  colonel,
had  started  an  aviation  school  near  Hangchow.57    Jouett  directed
this  training  program  until  Chiang  Kai-shek  obtained  am  Italian
Air  Mission  in  1934;     Shortly  a.fter  this  Jouett  ended  his
progl.an  and  left  the  country  in  1935.58    The  next,   and  most
important,  American  to  play  a  role  in  Ohina's  aviation  program
was  Claire  Ii.   Chennault.
The   saga  of  Colonel  Claire  L.   Chennault,   U.S.  Army  Air
Col.ps  Retired,   is  largely  the  story  of  United  States  aviation
assistance  i;o  China.     Colonel  Chenna,ult  became  involved  in
China's  aviation  training  program  even  befol.e  his  retirement
from  the  American  military.     Before  the  war  started  Roy  Holbrook,
an  ex-Air  Corps  pilot  sel.ving  as  a  flying  instruct;or  in  China,
asked  Chennault's  assistance  in  finding  American  instructors
for  the  Chinese  air  force.   .Among  those  that  Chennault  I.ecom-
mended  and  who  served  as  instructors  were  former  Sergeants
John  H.   Williamson  and  Billy  MacDonald,   both  men  former  members
of  the  AI.my  Air  Corp's  famed  "Flying  Trapeze."    After  Chennault's
retirement  from  the  military  on  April  30,   1937,  he  accepted  an
offer  from  Madame  Chiang  Ka,i-shek  to  do  a  three-month  sul.vey
of  the  Chinese  air  force.     Chennault  tl.aveled  to  Japan  on  the
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arriving  in  Kobe,  Japan  in
Mayi   1937,   and  from  there  went  on  to  the  Asian  mainland.59
0hennault  was  in  China  making  the  aviation  survey  when
the  Marco  Polo  Bridge  incident  took  plaLce.    With  this  start
of  hostilities  he  offered  his  services  to  the  Generalissimo
and  was  placed  in  charge  of  the  final  tl.aiming  of  Chinese  fighter
groups.6°    Chermault  took  his  mission  seriously  and  began  work
in  trying  to  build  and  improve  Chinals  air  forces.    His  reports
to  the  Generalissimo  were  extremely  critical  of  the  Italiari
Air  Mission.    He  found  their  training  school  at  Loyang  to  be
a  complete  farce,  the  aircraft  assembly  plant  at  Nanchang  a
fraud,  and  even` voiced  his  suspicions  that  the  Italians  had
sold  aerial  surveys  of  strategic  areas  in  China  to  the| Japanese.
Of  the  five-hundred  aircraft  carried  on  the  Chinese  Aero  Com-
mission  roster,  Chennault  found  only  ninety-one  aircl.aLft  fit
for  combat  assigrment.61    Soon  after  accepting  his  position
with  the  Chinese  military,  Chennault  was  leading  air  sorties
against  the  Japanese.    He  ignored  Japanese  demands  that  American
airmen  leave  China's  service  and  did  likewise  to  orders  and
threats  of  arrest,  court-martial,  or  loss  of  citizenship  from
the  United  States  Department  of  State  issued  through  the  Amer-
ican  Consul-General  in  Shanghai.62
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Part  of  the  Japanese  stra,tegy  to  break  the  Nationalist
government  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  and  the  will  of  the  Chinese  people
called  for  "heavy  a.nd  indiscriminate''  bombing  of  the  Chinese
population.     Chennault  played  a  large  role  in  the  development
of  a  warning  system  and  construction  of  shelters  that  caused
this  policy  to  be  unsuccessful.     I)uring  this  time,   1938-1939,
Chennault  argued  for  the  purchase  of  aircraft  fl.om  European
and  American  soul'ces.     The  Chinese  were  hesitant   to  do  so  and
with  the  invasion  of  Poland  in  1939,   the  chance  was  lost.65
Chennault  tried  many  ways  to  obtain  United  States  assistance
and  involvement  to  aid  China.     Several  times  he  asked  to  be
recalled  to  active  status  with  the  Air  Corps.     In  one  plan  he
wished  to  train  Chinese  pilots  in  the  United  States,  and  later
he  offered  to  be  recalled  to  active  sta.tus  after  the  Gel.man
invasion  of  Poland  in  1939,   but  the  United  States  was  not  yet
ready  for  so  drastic  a  step.64
The  su.oject  of  American  flying  instructors  came  up  many
times  during  conversations  between  Chinese  and  American  officials
in  1940.     On  January  3,   1940,   the  First  Secl.etary  of  the  Chinese
Finbassy  in  Washington  approached  the  Stab-e  Department's  Division
of  Far  Eastern  Affairs  concerning  obtaining  American  instructors.
The  State  Department  replied  that  they  preferred  not  to  become
involved  even  if  the  role  of  American  aviators  \`rould  be  instruct-
ional  and  not  involve  combat.     It  was  suggested  that  perha,ps
Chennault  could  find  qualified  men  in  the  United  States  and
China  and  the
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engage  them  in  Chinals  service.65    This  line  of  request  was
continued  on  October  18,   1940,  with  Chiang  Kai-shek  asking
Ambassador  Johnson  for  more  American  aircraft,   spare  parts,
and  volunteers.66    Secretary  I-lull  cabled  Ambassador  Johnson  on
October  24,   1940,   that  since  July,   1937,   1icences  had  been
granted  for  the  export  of  279  aircraft  to  China,  with  the
value  of  these  aircraft,  plus  spare  parts,  approximately
$22,000,000.     Hull  also  pointed  out  thai;  China  ranked  in  first
place  in  airplane  purchases  from  the  United  States  in  1937,
in  third  place  in  1938,   dropped  to  twenty-first  in  1939,  and
was  eleventh  in  the  first  half  of  1940.    During  the  first
eight  months  of  1940  licenses  for  115  airplanes  to  China  had
been  approved  with  a  number  no`ir     enroute   to  Rangoon.67,
In  November,   1940,   Chiang  Kai-shek  sent  Chennault  and
Major-General  I`'Iao  Pang-ch'u  to  Wa,shington  requesting  American
aviation  assistance.     On  November  25,   1940,   Dr.   I.   V.   Soong
presented  the   Chennault-I`'{a.o  package  to  the  Presidentls
Iifaison  Committee,   a  civilian  agency  composed  to  coordinate
a.I.ms  purchases  in  the  United  States,   for  consideration.     The
req.uest  was  for  the  follo\..ring  to  be  delivered  in  1941:   500
combat  planes,  150  basic  trainers,  10  transport  aircraft,
i;wenty  percent  spare  parts,   rna,terials  for  consi;ruction  of
14  airfields  and  1221anding  strips,   `and  ammunition  and  other
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supplies  for  a  yearls  operations.68    Also  included  was  the
request  for  some  200  American  flying  instructors  and  150
American  maintenance  personnel.69     0n  December  1,   1940,   the
Export-Import  Bank  credit  of  $50,000,000  was  announced,   of
this  anmount  $25,000,COO  was  free  to  be  used  for  purchases
such  as  military  aircraft.7°    Following  the  credit  announce-
ment  came  a  decision  from  the  Si;ate  Department  on  December  4,
1940,  to  provide  fifty  aircraft  to  china.71
In  January,   1941,   Chennauli;,  with  the  assistance  of
Secl.etary  Morgenthau,   was  able  to  obtain  almost  immediate
delivery  of  one-hundred  fighter  aircraft.    These  airplanes,
one-hundred  P-40Bs,   had  been  made  available  to  Sweden  from
British  allocations  because  that  countl`y  considered  the  model
to  be  obsolete  for  the  warfare  then  taking  place  in  Europe.72
jEven  with  these  aircraft  available,  China  ran  into  numel'ous
problems  seeking  armaments  and  ammunition  for  combat  use.     An
arrangement  was  made  with  Great  Britain  for  the  necessary
armaments  in  return  for  one-hundred  later  model  a,ircraft  sched-
uled  for  China,,  but  not  yet  produced.73    Obtaining  anmunition
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for  the  planes  proved  to  be  almost  as  much  trouble.    Finally,
Dr.  Lauchlin  Currie  gained  permission  from  I'resident  Roosevelt
for  the  release  of  some  1,500,000  rounds  of  anlnunition  from
War  Department  Army  stocks.74    These  aircraft  were  purchased
at  a  cost  of  $8,900,000  from  Export-Import  Bank  credits.75
With  the  necessary  ail.craft  now  a,vailable,   Chennault  needed
one  other  item,  which  he  considered  to  be  the   "key  to  a  suc-
cessful  aviation  program,"  American  pilots  and  ground  crews.
Fortunately  for  Chennault  and  China,   the  State  Department  was
talcing  a  more  liberal  interpretation  of  United  States  law  con-
cerning  Americaris  serving  foreign  powers  than  had  been  the
case  earlier.    Also,   such  a  plan  now  had  the  official  blessing
of  cabinet  members  Knox,   Si;imson,   and  Morgenthau,   and  quost
importantly  the  backing  of  President  Roosevelt.76    With  this
administration  approval  the  American  Volunteer  Group  to  China
was  established.     Mr.  Willia,in  D.   Pa,wley  signed  a  non-profit
contract  with  Dr.   I.   V.   Soong  for  the  operation  of  this  group
and  Chennault  received  the  title  of   Wsupervisor.w77
Recruitment  of  qualified  personnel  proved  a  pl.oblem  for
Chennault.     He  needed  men  trained  as  aviator.s  by  the  Army
and  Na.vy  and  this  `tra.s  a  tim.e  of  expansion  of  our  military
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forces  and  the  services  did  not  wish  to  give  up  persorme|.78
0n  April  15,   1941,   Chennault  received  help  on  the  problem
from  the  President,  as  he  signed  an  unpublished  executive
ol.der  allowing  Army,   Navy,   and  Ma,rime  Corps  flyel's  and  ground
pel'sonnel  to  leave  active  service  and  join  the  American
Volunteer  Group.79    No\.r,   Chermault  was  able  to  recruit  over
one-hundred  pilots  for  the  military  services.    Also  one-hun-
dred  and  f ifty  maintenance  and  ground  crew  persormel  were
recruited.     The  American  Volunteer  Group  was  able  to  a,ttract
personnel,  not  only  with  the  a,dventure,  but  offered  high  pay
for  those  volunteering  their  services.    Pay  for  pilots  was
from  $600  i;o   $750  per  month,   with  a  $500  bonus  guaranteed  by
the  Chinese  government  for  each  Japanese  plane  shot  doim  or
destroyed  on  the  ground.     The  pay  for  ground  cl`ew  personnel
averaged  $300  per  month.80
On  June  9,   1941,   the  first  8.roup  of  American  volunteers
sailed  for  Rang.oon  aboar(I  a  Dutch  vessel.     Admiral  Harold  R.
Stark,   the  Chief  of  .i.`?ova,i  Operations,   provided  the  vessel  a
warship  escort  through  the  Japcan. ese  mandate  islands.     Mr.
Edi.rard  Pal.rley,   the  brother  of  William  Pawley,   arrived  in
Chungking  ahea.d  of  the  volunteers  to  check  on  preparations
for  the  force.     He  found  little  ha,d  been  arranged,  but  for-
tunately  he  wa.s  able  to  gain  permission  I-ron  Air  Chief  Marshal
Sir  Robert  Broolce-Popham,   the  British  cormander-in-chief  in
China  and  the
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the  Far  East,   to  use  two  British  airfields  in  Burma.  These
fields  available  were  Toungoo  and  Magive,  both  granted  fol'
the  object  of  training  only  and  specifically  not  to  be  used
as  bases  to  attack  the  Ja.panese.     The  fir.st  volunteers  al.rived
on  July  28,   1941,   and  were   sent   to   Toungoo,   Burma.81
Thl`ous.hout  the  remainder  of  the  surmer  and  fall  of  1941,
Chennault  worked  and  drilled  his  volunteers.     He  found  that
he  suffered  great  shol.tages  of  almost  every  item,   spare  parts,
tires,   amm`mition,   colnmuncations  equipment,   etc.     Also  this
period  of  time  i`ras  used  to  weed  out  those  unfit  and  undesirable
members  of  his  team,  with  twenty-five  men  returning  to  the
United  States.     By  November,   -the   ''supervisor"  had  a  trained
fighting  force  but  was  largely  without  usable  aircl.aft;    Of
his  planes,   tweni;y-three  were  in  need  of  engines  or  other  parts,
twenty-six  had  flat  or  no  tires,  and  only  forty-six were  avail-
able  for  service.     Resulting  from  his  request  to  American  and
British  sources  a  large  a.mount  of  spare  parts  were  gathered  up
and  shipped  by  air  f]_.ei.r:Tht   to  his  Burma  Ba.se.     Ihese  were   the
fir.st  items  furnished  the  America,n  Volunteer  Group  covered  by
the  Ijend-Ijease  .I.)rot-raLm.     By  the   firsi;  week  in  December,   Chen-
nault's  forces  included  ninety  trained  pilots,   one-hundred  and
eighty  American  gI.ound  creunen,   and  his  planes  were  divided
into  three  pul.suit  squadrons  of  eighteen  planes  each  with  a
reserve  force  of  ten  aircraft.82
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In  May,   1941,   at  the  request  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  for  an
American  air  mission,  Brigadier  General  Henry  8.   Clagett,   th`e
Commander  of  the  American  Interceptor  Forces  in  the  Philippines,
and  his  aid  Colonel  H.   H.   George  made  a  survey  of  China's  air-
fields.     Clagett  was  impressed  by  the  work  and  effort  that  the
Chinese  had  put  into  their  airfields  and  believed  that  they
would  handle  the  latest  aircraft  and  equipment  if  the  pilots
and  gI.ound  crews  were  properly  trained.     lie  further  stated  that
it  would  be  necessary  to  train  Chinese  pilots  in  the  Philippines
or  on  fields  in  the  United  States.83    General  Clagettls  tour
of  China's  airfields  `iras  reported  in  a  national  newsmagazine
in  June,  1941,  and  infol.nation  presented  that  American  pilots
would  protect  the  vital  But.rna  Road.84    Ijater  Iiend-Iiease  funds
were  made  available  for  the  ira,ining  of  Chinese  pilots  and  the
first  group  of  fifty  Chinese  pilots  arrived  a,t  Thunder.bird
Field  in  Arizona,  for  bra,ining  in  october,   |94|.85
By  mid-1941,  more  aircraft  were  allocated  under  Iiend-Iiease
for  China.     Dr.   Currie  recoITLmended  to  the  President  on  July  19,
1941,   that  a  number  of  pursuit  type  and  bomber  aircraft  be  made
available  to  China.86    Currie  was  able  to  get  some  of  this  request
approved  and  ha,d  the  State  I)epartment  cable  Ambassador  Gauss,
China  -America's 4EL.   Pp.   44-45.
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on  July  23,   1941,   to  inform  Madame  Chiang  that  the  President
had  agreed  to  provide  sixty-six  bombers  to  China  with  twenty-
four  to  be  delivered  immediately.87    By  September,   Currie  had
scheduled  for  delivery  in  the  following  six  months  269  pursuit
aircraft,   661ighi;  bombers,  10  transports,   and  70  training
aircraft.88
0n  October  30,   1941,   Ch.iang  Kai-shek  reported  that  he
believed  the  Japanese  would  strilce  the  vital  communications
and  transport  center  of  Kunmin8..     He  asked  that  the  United
States  send  an  armed  force  for  possible  intervention  in  case
his  beliefs  proved  correct. .   General  Marshall,   the  Army  Chief
of  Staff  and  Admiral  Stark,   Chief  of  Naval  Operations,   voiced
their  disagreement  and  the  decision  was  reached  to  reinforce
the  American  Volunteer  Group.89    With  this  decision,   I.ecruit-
ment  for  a  second  volunteer  g`roup  was  started   on  November  i,
1941.     The  second  group  departed  later  that  month  and  became
stranded  in  Australia  after  the  Pearl  IIarbor  attack.    Also,
late  in  1941,   the  British  agreed  to  furnish  a  volunteer  squad-
I'on  to  serve  along  side  the  American  volunteers,  but  this  was
interrupted  in  the  planning.  stages  by  the  Japanese  attack  of
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As  in  the  case  of  the  granting  of  Export-Import  credits
earlier,   decisions  to  assist  the  Chinese  were  made  to  offset
or  confront  events  taking  place.    Aid  to  China  increased  as
the  Japanese  threat  to  Southeast  Asia  became  more  real.     The
decision  to  gI.eatly  bolster  the  Chinese  air  force  and  the
American  Volunteer  G.roup  in  the   summer  of  1941,   was  reached
aft;er  the  a-erman  inva,sion  of  Russia  in  June,   1941,   and  the
Japanese-Vichy  French  agreements  on  Indochina.
Certainly  American-Japanese  relations,  a,s  they  grew
more  strained  in  1941,   gave  the  Chinese  moral  support.     Jusl;
as  the  embargo  on  scl`ap  iron  and  aviation  gasoline  in  December,
1940,   gave  indireci;  support  to  China,   the  decision  of  President
Roosevelt  to  freeze  Japanese  assets  and  end  the  sale  of  oil
on  July  26,   1941,   g`ave  more  indirect  assistance  to  China
and  greatly  increased  their  mora,1e  as  they  looked  more  at  the
United  States  as  an  ally  rather  than  a  friendly  power.
Cha,pter  VI
CONcliusION
The  study  of  the  United  States  assistance  to  China  in
the  years  1937  to  1941  has  demonstrated  a  continuously,changing
foreign  policy  on  the  part  of  the  United  States.     The  foreign
policy  of  this  nai;ion  i;oward  Asia  in  cr;enera,1  and  China  in
particular  during  those  years  was  iiassive  rather  than  active.
The  United  States  seemed  to  react  -'co  \rorld  events  as  they
were  taking  place  instead  of  procc-eding  with  an  active  foreign
policy  which  may  have  helped  influence  world  events  and  actions.
Perhaps  .t;he  best  term  to  describe  this  nation's  foreign  policy
in  the  late  1930's  is  a  policy  of  neutrality.    Just  as  this
kind  of  diplomacy  failed  to  work  in  the   second  decade  of  the
twentieth  centul`y,   so   it  failed  to  work  again  i=~L  i;he  1930's.
Unlike   the  period  before  l'Jorld  llJar  I,   the  United  StaJces  Congress
enacted  laws  in  the  1930's  to  keep  this  nation  from  foreign  wa.rs
and  to  keep  forei3-n  wars  a\'Jay  from  this  nat;ion.
(106)
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Much  has  been  written  about  the  neutrality  legislation.
Io  avoid  possible  involvement  in  foreign wars  this  legislation
was  enacted  during  the  Spanish  Civil  War  and  the  Italian-Ethio-
pian  crisis,  but  President  Roosevelt  failed  to  find  a war  in
Asia  in  July,  1937,  and  the  country  went  to  a  "twenty-four  hour
policy."    Almost  all  historians  agree  that  President  Roosevelt's
reasons  were  to  make  assistance  available  to  China  in  her
struggle  against  Japanese  aggression.    However,  it  is  open  to
debate  if  this  decision  aided  the  Chinese  as  much  as  it  did  the
Japanese.    The  President  presented  his  views  in  a  press  con-
ference  on  April  21,  1938.    His  reasons  for.  the  decision  were
that  Japan  did  not  purchase  arms  or  munitions  from  this  country,
she  produced  her` own.    what  Japan  did  purchase  was  raw |naterials
and  fuels,  and  the  Neutrality  Iiaws  did  not  forbid  the  saLle  of
such  items.     China,  on  the  other  haria,was  forced  to  buy  finished
products,  and  she  was  purchasing  arms  and  munitions  from  this
country  through  third  parties.1
Although  the  Neutrality  Iiaws  were  not  publicly  applied
they  were  undeniably  behind  many  decisions  and  actions  by  the
United  States.    An  excellent  example  of  this  was  the  removal  of
Chinese  purchased  aircraLft  from  the  American  flag  vessel  SS
Wichita.    Also  arms  and  munitions  sales  were  refused  to  China
except  on  a  cash  basis  even  if  a  war  had  not  been  found  and  the
neutrality  legislation  had  not  been  applied.
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The  greatest  opportunity  for  a  strong  stand  by  the
United  States  was  at  the  Brussels  meeting  of  the  Nine-Power
Treaty  members  in  November.,   1937.     Because   of  the  failure   of
the  United  States  to  provide  the  necessary  leadership,   this
last  good  chance  for  peace  was  lost.     Perhaps  the  isolationist
feeling  of  the  American  people  and  their  Congress  dictated
this  failure  in  American  statecraft  at  Brussels.    President
Roosevelt's  Chicago   ''Quarantine  Speech,"  presented  just
before  the  Brussels  Conference,   had  brought  demands  of  neu-
trality  and  isolation  from  this  Asian  conflict.    But,  even
if  the  Americari  public  were  isolationist,   it  would  not  have
been  neutra.i  in  feeling.     This  feeling  is  evident  as  shown
in  the  large  amount  of  Red  Cross  relief  funds  collected  for
the  Chinese.
Foreign  assistance  to  China  during  the  years  1937  to  1940
is  largely  a  story  of  Russian  assista,nee  and  not  American.
Just  as  the  Soviet  Union  was  willin8`  to  take  a  strong  stand
at  the  Brussels  Conference,   so  she  was  the  first  to  come  to
the  aid  of  China.     Severa,i  reasons  for  this  may  be  found.
The  Soviet  Union,   other  than  China,   stood  most  to  lose  from
a  powerful,   victorous,   aggressive  Japa,n.     The  Russians  had
combated  the  Japanese  earlier  in  the  century  over  concessions
in  Korea  and  Manchuria.     Also,   during  World  War  I  and  the
Russian  civil  war,   Ja.panese  troops  occupied  much  of  Sibel.ia.
The  Soviets  paid  dearly  for   I;heir  understanding  and  appreciation
for  the   ''land  of  the  I.ising  sun."    Therefore,   the  Soviet  Union
looked  at  the  Nationalist  government  of  Chiang  Kai-shek  as
109
their  first  line  of  defense  against  an  aggressive  Japan.    If
Japan  were  to  be  victorious  and  obtain  the  resources  of  China,
would  not  the  Soviet  Union  be  the  next  victim?    Also,   one  must
recall  that  an  understanding  had  been  reached  between  Chiang
Kai-shek  and  the   communists  at  Siam  in  December,   1936.
The  value  of  Soviet  assistance  to  China  is  almost  un-
measurable  in  terms  of  Chinese  resistance  to  the  Japanese.
The  Soviets  provided  a  "volunteer"  air  group  to  China  and  a
military  mission  that  pl.e-dated  the  American  Volunteer  Group
and  the  Magruder  mission  by  three  years.     It  was  only  after
the  imminent  threat  in  Europe  that  the  Soviet  self-interest
caused  assistance  to  the  Chinese  to  be  diverted  to  enlal.gement
of  her  own  military.     Surely  the  Soviet  Union  was  able?to  take
almost  immediate  actions  because  she  was  not  hampered  by  a
democratic  form  of  governmerit,   and  she  did  so  in  the  interest
of  her  own  self-defense.
United  States  assistance  to  China  from  1937  to  late  1940
was  largely  in  terms  of  mol.al  support.     The  silver  purchase
policy  of  the  United  States  Treasury  was  indeed  a  help  to  China
in  terms  of  foreign  purchase  power.     But  this  policy  was  not
a  policy  designed  to  assist  China,   but  a  domestic  measure  en-
acted  to  help  overcome  the  great  depression.     True,   the  policy
was  continued  to  assist  the  Chinese  to  convert  their  silver
holdings  into  usable  foreign  exchange,   but  the  United  States
received  the  silver  and  the  market  for  the  gI.anted  exchange.
't,rith  China,'s  silver  stocks  so  rapidly  depleted,   a  series  of
Export-Import  Bank  loaLns  were  granted.     These  loans  were   of
ilo
great  value  to  the  embattled  Chinese  although  many  "strings"
were  attached.     Again  this  country  was  the  only  market  where
the  credits  could  be  used  and  in  some  instances  the  spending
of  matching  Chinese  funds  was  required.     The  fact  remains  that
United  States  assistance  to  China  from  the  Marco  Polo  Bridge
incident  until  late  in  1940  was  almost  insignificant  in  com-
parison  to  the  Soviet  assistance.
In  1941,   economic  and  military  assistance  from  the  United
States  to  China  rapidly  picked  up  and  continued  to  increase
throughout  that  year.     This  aid  la.rgely  took  the  form  of  Ijend-
Lease  assistance  and  the  American  Volunteer  Group.     Inasmuch  `
as  the  loans  g.ranted  through  the  Export-Import  Bank  had  been
carefully  timed  to  offset  Japanese  successes  and  i;o  bolster
Chinese  morale,   assistance  granted  in  1941  was  keyed  by  wol.ld
events  and  American  self-interest  rather  than  a  great  Chinese
need.     The  Chinese  had  been  in  a  despel`ate  situation  since
late  1937.     It  was  i;rue  that  there  was  a  vacuum  i;hat  needed
to  be  filled  with  the  slowdoThm  and  halt  of  the  Soviet  assistance.
Ijend-Ijease  was  an  example  of  Anglo-British  diplomacy.
The  program  was  intended  and  planned  to  assist  Great  Britain
against  the  I\Tazi  war  machine.     China  had  difficulties  in
getting  a  pl.ogram  of  assistance  in  operation  because  she  had
not  been  involved  in  the  planning  stages.     1^rhen  it  became
China  and  the  IIel
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obvious  that  Japan  would  strike  into  Southeast  Asia,  China
began  to  receive  assistance.
Even  the  Iiend-Lease  assistance  to  China  is  best  described
as  too  little  and  too  late.    By  the  time  China  was  given  due
consideration  and  a  program  worked  out,  the  supply  was  almost
exhausted.     Great  Britain,   the  Soviet  Union,  and.  our  own  needs
were  given  priority  over  the  needs  of  China.    Also,  the  pro-
gram  was  too  late;  not  that  China  could  not  benefit  from  the
assistance,  but  how was  it  to  be  delivered.    By  this  late  date
only  the  Burma  Road  route  was  available  and  it  was  soon  closed
in  early  1942.
\
It  should  be  pointed  out  that  American  assistance  to
China  did  not  bring  on  the  Japanese  attack  on  Pearl  Harbor.
The  Japanese  attack  was  prompted  by  the  United  States  oil  embargo
of  July,  1941.     The  Japanese  were  forced  to  look  on  Southeast
Asia  as  the  source  of  this  critically  needed  item.     To  move
into  that  area  would  bring  action  froh  the  United  States  as
she  moved  to  support  the  British,  Dutch,  and  her  own  self-interest.
Believing  this  to  be  correct,  the  Japanese  decided  to  strike
first.    Also,  it  can  be  reasonably  said  that  the  United  States
would  not  have  entered  the  war  regardless  of  China's  difficulties.
The  United  States  best  interests  were  served  if  the  Japanese
military  could  be  tied  down  in  China.     The  extent  of  aggression
that  American  policy  would  not  allow  the  Japanese  to  exparjd  beyond
what  was  a  line  north  of  Dutch  Indonesia  and  BI.itish  Malaya.3
(chic:::?u5n=8:r#e§±§a'Sh=%±±::=5r*sgife§)#?¥£3.
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Enjoying  the  advantage  of  hindsight  it  seems  obvious  that
the  time  for  aLction  in  halting  Japanese  aggression  was  at
Brussels  in  1937.     There  was  no  war  going  on  in  Eul'ope  and  the
other  members  of  the  Nine-Power  Treaty  would  have  probably
followed  a  United  States  lead  in  actions  against  Japan.    Almost
certainly  an  embargo  on  oil  would  have  been  effective  at  that
time,  with  little  to  fear  in  a  Japanese  attack  on  Southeast
Asia.    But  this  was  not  done;  the  opportunity  was  lost.    Perhaps
Brussels  should  be  temed  the  llMunich  of  Asia."    Also,  riaving
the  benefit  of  hindsight  and  speculation,  one  wonders  what
effect  strong  actio,n  by  a  concert  of  nations  would  have  had
on  the  world  at  that  tine.
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